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Two studies were conducted to: (1) investigate children’s developing 
understanding of mental state words , specifically “think” and “know,” and (2) 
explore possible differences between U.S. English-speaking and Brazilian 
Portuguese-speaking children in their understanding of these words. Brazilian 
Portuguese is of interest because it has two words for “think” (one indicating a 
lesser degree of certainty, ‘achar,’ and another indicating the process of thinking, 
‘pensar’) and two words for “know” (one indicating knowing a fact, ‘saber,’ and 
another indicating knowing a person, ‘conhecer’). Predictions were that there
would be developmental changes in the understanding of these words and that 
having such distinctions marked in their language would help Brazilian children 
in the process of acquiring a conceptual understanding of “think” and “know.”
viii
In Study 1, 48 English-speaking children, divided into three age groups 
(2½, 3½, and 4½) participated in a series of tasks during which the degree of 
certainty about the identity of an object was varied. Children were asked “Do you 
know that this is a …. or do you think that this is a ….?” 
In Study 2, 32 Brazilian Portuguese-speaking and 32 English-speaking 
children in each of 3 age groups (4, 5, and 6) saw a series of videotaped scenarios 
during which the two senses of “know” and the two senses of “think” were 
indicated by novel words. Participants were asked to interpret the novel words. 
Children also were asked metalinguistic questions regarding whether each pair of 
words differed in meaning. 
Results suggest that a complete understanding of these mental state words 
starts emerging at age 4 and that an understanding of “know” may precede an 
understanding of “think.” The effects of language were less than anticipated. The 
two senses of “think” and “know” that were tested may be represented 
conceptually by U.S. children even if they are not marked in the language. 
Nonetheless, having the distinctions marked in the language appear to increase 
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An important milestone in cognitive development is the acquisition of a 
theory of mind, or an ability to explain and predict human behavior in terms of 
mental phenomena (i.e., intentions, beliefs and emotions). A substantial body of 
research has been devoted in the last two decades to improving our understanding 
of how and when children develop such a theory (e.g., Astington, Harris & Olson, 
1988; Flavell et al., 1983; Frye & Moore, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). The findings originating from this research enterprise have 
provided us with a window into children’s thinking about the mind at different 
points of the developmental process.
Recently, there has been increasing interest in the investigation of possible 
relationships between language and theory of mind (Astington, 2001; Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 2000, 2003; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; 
Shatz, 1994). A study of children’s language about the mental world may prove to 
be informative of the developmental process through which young children 
achieve an understanding of others’ minds and thinking (Schwanenflugel, 1998). 
In fact, an investigation of children’s language about the mental world can be 
fruitful for several other reasons. For example, little work has been conducted 
regarding the acquisition of a wide range of abstract words (Souza, 2002). Mental 
state words, like any other category of abstract words, have referents that cannot 
be seen, or more specifically, that do not exist in concrete form in the external 
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world. Consequently, the process underlying the acquisition of these terms may 
differ from those that have been identified for learning of concrete words like 
“mommy,” “car,” or “bottle.” An investigation of how children acquire mental 
state words may be revealing of specific strategies or processes involved in the 
acquisition of abstract words, and more generally, in word learning. 
A second reason that mental state words are interesting is that they point 
to an important asynchrony between language and cognition. There is consistent 
evidence that children acquire their first mental state words early in life, around 
their second birthday (Barstch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 
1983). However, some studies indicate that a more sophisticated understanding of 
mental states appears much later, at around the age of 4 (Johnson & Maratsos, 
1977; Miscione, O’Brien, & Greenberg, 1978; Moore, Bryant & Furrow, 1989). It 
remains unclear what the underlying causes of this asynchrony are. When very 
young children are using mental state terms, are they making reference to a true 
mental state? Can they really understand the concept of a mental state? Are they 
using those terms as conversational devices (e.g., using “you know” as a pause-
filler) or are they using them to refer to mental states like “think” and “know” but 
without a complete understanding of the concepts? 
Finally, another good reason for the interest in mental state words is that 
languages vary in the specific mental state terms that they use. For example, in 
Chinese, there is a verb that explicitly denotes “thinking falsely.” In Portuguese, 
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two different words correspond to the English verb “know.” One could raise the 
question of whether language differences influence children’s understanding of 
mental state terms or, as in the case of Chinese, children’s performance in false-
belief tasks (Lee & Olson, 1999; Liu, Wellman & Tardif, 2003). Consequently, 
research in this area allows us to examine possible interactions between language 
and thought, specifically, we might ask whether the pattern of development of 
mental states and mental state terms is universal or whether linguistic differences 
affect the acquisition of mental state concepts and mental state terms. However, 
there is little cross-linguistic work looking at the development of an 
understanding of mental states. 
I will present in the following chapter a review of the different studies on 
the acquisition of mental state words. Firstly, I will focus on what naturalistic 
studies have revealed about when these words emerge in children’s vocabularies 
and how young children acquire them. The goal here is to discuss research that is 
relevant to our understanding of how and when children acquire these mental state 
words and whether there is something special about the process through which 
they acquire mental state words when compared to concrete words or other kinds 
of abstract words.
Secondly, I will discuss the different arguments concerning the 
relationship between language and theory of mind. There is disagreement among 
researchers in the field concerning the role of language in the development of a 
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theory of mind (ToM). Some researchers argue that language may play an 
important and specific role in children’s understanding that others have minds and 
can have beliefs different from their own (Astington, 2001; Astington & Jenkins, 
1999; De Villiers & DeVilliers, 2000); of this group, some hold a particularly 
strong version of this position (De Villiers & De Villiers, 2003), claiming that 
more advanced aspects of an understanding of mind actually depend on language. 
Other researchers are more cautious and suggest that more studies looking at the 
exact nature of the relationship between language and theory of mind are needed 
(Shatz, 1994; Shatz et al., 2003). The goal of the discussion presented here is to 
provide justification for why an investigation of mental state words may 
contribute to our current understanding of a relationship between language and 
theory of mind, and not to provide a review of the literature on the development 
of a theory of mind.
In the third section of this literature review, I will present recent evidence 
on possible differences among speakers of different languages regarding the 
acquisition of mental states and the development of a theory of mind. In order to 
investigate possible effects of language on cognition, and more specifically, on 
theory of mind, one needs to rely on as many cross-linguistic comparisons as 
possible and, particularly comparisons between languages that differ in 
theoretically interesting ways. The more comparisons there are, the better the 
chance that possible cultural confounds will be eliminated (Bloom & Keil, 2001). 
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Finally, I will describe two studies investigating the development of 
children’s understanding of mental state words. The purpose of Study 1 was to 
investigate children’s understanding of the distinction between “think” and 
“know” as indicating different degrees of certainty and, more specifically, to test 
the assumption that children may display an understanding of this distinction at an 
earlier time than suggested by previous research (Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; 
Miscione et al., 1978; Moore et al., 1989) . The goal of Study 2 was to explore 
similarities and differences in children’s understanding of mental states across 
languages. Portuguese is of interest because there are important differences 
between English and Portuguese concerning mental state words like “think” and 
“know.” More specifically, the main goal of Study 2 was to investigate whether 
English-speaking children differ from Brazilian children in the way they 
understand the finer-grained senses of “think” and “know” that are present in 
Portuguese but not in English (i.e., “the act of thinking” versus a “thought” or 
“opinion,” and, “knowing a person” versus “knowing a fact”). 
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II. Literature Review
Mental State Words: when are they acquired?
Among a child’s first fifty words, the majority of terms refer to concrete 
entities in the child’s world, for example, food, people, body parts and household 
items (Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001; Nelson, 1973). The predominance of 
concrete words in children’s early vocabularies may be one of the reasons that 
most of the word learning research has focused on the acquisition of concrete 
words. Although concrete words predominate in the beginning, a significant part 
of children’s early vocabularies consists of words that map onto abstract concepts 
and these words start emerging even before the second birthday (Barstch & 
Wellman, 1995; Gopnik, 1984; Shatz et al., 1983). As discussed above, our main 
interest lies in one special category of abstract words: mental states.
Recent research has helped enhance our understanding of the acquisition 
of mental state words. As far as emotions are concerned, most children acquire 
their first feeling-state words (e.g., happy, sad) at around the age of 18 to 20 
months (Bretherton & Beeghly 1982; Dunn, Bretherton & Munn, 1987; Wellman, 
Harris, Banerjee & Sinclair, 1995). Wellman et al.’s (1995) findings also indicate 
that by age 2, children can use emotion terms to refer to themselves or others as 
well as to past, present and future states. During the period between 2 and 5 years 
of age, children become capable of making several important distinctions: 
between emotions or pains and the circumstances that elicit them; between 
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emotions and actions (e.g., anger vs. hitting) or the expressions they cause (e.g., 
happiness vs. smiling); and they can attribute distinct emotional experiences to 
different individuals (Wellman et al., 1995). 
Children start producing words that refer to desires, such as want1, and 
wish, very early: by 1 ½ to 2 years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Bartsch 
and Wellman (1995) argue that the acquisition and understanding of desire words 
represent a “foundation for the child’s continuing efforts to understand the mind” 
(p. 93). It is after their second birthday, however, that they develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of desire words. For example, they are able to make 
use of contrastives indicating they understand that “what I want” may be different 
from “what somebody else wants.” In addition, they seem to understand that 
“what I want” may be different from “what I get,” in other words, that the wish 
and the outcome may not necessarily coincide. 
Desire words seem to emerge before belief words like think and know
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Bartsch and Wellman (1995) argue that a child’s 
initial conception of desire is not necessarily representational. In other words, 
when a 2-year-old is saying “Mary wants an apple,” he/she is not construing in 
his/her head a representation of an apple (or of Mary wanting an apple) and 
understanding that his/her representation may or may not be in accordance with 
the given circumstances of real life (the presence of an apple in the immediate 
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surroundings). A 2-year-old is simply relying, according to this view, on his/her 
knowledge of the world (his/her knowledge, for example, of apples and where 
they may be found) and attributing to Mary a desire for a real object in the world, 
without having a representation in the mind of a hypothetical object or event (e.g., 
having or eating the apple). 
Words that refer to thoughts and beliefs start emerging in children’s 
vocabularies in the months shortly after their second birthday (Barstch & 
Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983). Shatz (1994), for example, reports that, in the 
period between 25 and 30 months, her grandson, Ricky, understood that think
could be used to indicate a probability (or a lesser degree of certainty). When 
Ricky’s mother was asked “Are there toys in the bag?” and she replied, “Yes, 
some little people, I think,” Ricky added “And a pig, maybe.” The first instances 
of know pointing to a state of “nonignorance” appeared to be used around the 30th
month (Shatz, 1994). Before then, know was being used only in stereotypical 
sentences like “I don’t know” but without any indication of a more sophisticated 
understanding of what this term refers to.
Studies looking at naturalistic data have revealed, in fact, that children 
first use mental verbs as conversational devices, and it is only during the third 
year of life that there seems to be reference to a true mental state (Barstch & 
1 Italics are used when I am referring to mental state words and capitals are used when I am 
referring to mental state concepts.
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Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983). There is evidence that the ability to produce 
the syntactic constructions needed to express mental states (such as predicate 
complementation) is present before the first reference to a true mental state. For 
example, Shatz et al. (1983) examined transcripts of a child from the CHILDES 
database (Abe) and found instances of sentences including predicate 
complementation (e.g., “show me how to work this”) prior to the first occurrence 
of a mental state utterance. Therefore, the limitations appear to be conceptual
rather than linguistic in nature. 
Once children are able to recognize that words like know and think refer to 
mental states, they are faced with the task of understanding what exactly makes 
each mental state distinct. There are data suggesting that it is only at a later period 
that children come to make such distinctions. 
Johnson and Maratsos (1977), for instance, investigated children’s 
understanding of THINK and KNOW at 3 and 4 years of age. Participants in this 
study were told a story about two characters. The first character (hider) moved an 
object from one location to another without the second character (seeker) 
knowing. They were then asked several questions: a) where the second character 
would look for the object, b) whether he “thought” it was in a certain location, c) 
whether he “knew” it was in that location and finally, d) a forced choice question: 
“Does the ‘seeker’ think it’s under box B or does he know it’s under box B?” The 
same questions were asked about the ‘hider.’ Results indicated that the 3-year-
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olds showed no discrimination between the think and the know questions and 
responded at chance to the forced-choice question. 
Another study (Miscione et al., 1978) tested children from 3 ½ to 7 years 
of age on their ability to make a distinction between KNOW and GUESS.
Children were asked to participate in a game during which they had to determine 
which of three “magic boxes” contained a small object that had been hidden
previously. In some conditions, participants saw the experimenter hide the object 
and in other conditions, they did not see the object being hidden. After choosing a 
box, they were asked whether they “knew” or “were guessing” the location of the 
object. Results indicated that no child younger than 4 was able to make a 
systematic distinction between KNOW and GUESS, that is, they either responded 
with know in all conditions or guess in all conditions or their responses were 
random. Between the ages of 4 and 5, children tended to associate know with 
successful performance (that is, the object is in the location predicted by them) 
and guess with an incorrect or unsuccessful performance.  
Johnson and Wellman (1980) were interested in children’s ability to 
differentiate three mental state verbs: know, guess, and remember. Additionally, 
they wanted to provide an alternative to the forced-choice question used in the 
Miscione et al. (1978) study. Johnson & Wellman (1980) argued that children’s 
responses to the forced-choice question could not reveal whether children were 
interpreting know and guess as opposites or whether they were associating 
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guessing with incorrect performance. 4- and 5-year-olds were presented with 8 
hidden-object tasks that varied according to 3 different criteria: a) whether the 
child knew about the location of the object beforehand; b) whether the child had 
immediate knowledge of the object’s location and c) whether the subject correctly 
found the object. Importantly, children were also presented with a “trick” 
condition during which the object was secretly moved to a different location. 
After each task, children were asked about the location of the hidden object and 
when an answer was provided, children were asked questions including each 
mental state verb: a) “Do you know it’s there?” b) “Do you think it’s there?” c) 
“Do you guess it’s there?”
Contrary to Miscione et al’s (1978) findings, their results suggested that 
GUESS was being judged like KNOW which is evidenced by children at age 4 
claiming to GUESS when their performance was “right” significantly more often 
than when their performance was “wrong.” However, both Miscione et al.’s 
(1978) and Johnson & Wellman’s (1980) findings seem to converge in two 
respects: preschoolers have trouble distinguishing between mental state words 
like remember, know and guess and it is only during the school years that children 
actually achieve a complete understanding of the differences between these terms.
Another study looking at children’s understanding of the use of mental 
terms to indicate relative certainty or reliability (Moore et al., 1989) provided 
additional evidence for the claim that a sophisticated understanding of mental 
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state verbs emerges only during the school years. Children (3- to 8-year-olds) 
were presented with a task in which they had to determine the location of a hidden 
object. But before they provided an answer, two different puppets uttered two 
conflicting statements involving one of the following mental terms: know, think  or 
guess. For example, one puppet would say “I think it’s in the red box” and the 
other one would say “I know it’s in the blue box.” Children were then asked to 
find the object. Results of this experiment suggested that it is only at around 4 
years of age that children start differentiating KNOW from THINK and from 
GUESS, and this understanding seems to be complete by age 5. 
Based on the results from the different studies discussed here, (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995; Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Miscione et al., 1978; Moore et al., 
1989; Shatz et al, 1983;), we could try to trace the developmental sequence that 
leads to children’s understanding of mental states. At around the second birthday, 
children start using mental state words but without any reference to true mental 
states or without a complete understanding of what mental states are (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983; Wellman et al., 1995). 
During the year after they turn 3, children start producing their first 
references to mental states, as can be seen in their use of contrastives (Barstch & 
Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983). Two kinds of contrastives are used: those in 
which children contrast thought and reality and those in which they contrast their 
own thoughts or beliefs with somebody else’s. Barstch and Wellman (1995) 
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provides us with good examples of each kind. An example of the first on comes 
from Abe (3;8): “I thought I could rip the papers off, ‘cept it doesn’t have any 
paper.” An example of the second kind of contrastive comes from Ross (3;3). An 
adult says “I thought you were downstairs” to which Ross replies “I thought me 
was upstairs.”  
At around the age of 4, children are then finally capable of displaying a 
more sophisticated understanding of mental states, one that includes, for example, 
an ability to distinguish among different mental states like KNOW versus THINK
(Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Miscione et al., 1978; Moore et al., 1989). 
Interestingly, this is also the period during which children start succeeding at 
false-belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al, 1985). However, 
there is no conclusive evidence yet about how these changes take place. More 
work examining the asynchrony present here is needed: children use words that 
refer to mental states early on but only two years later can they display an 
understanding of the semantic differences among these mental state words. 
Mental State Words: how are they acquired?
The questions of when children start producing mental state words and 
when they truly can refer to mental states are indeed fundamental; however, the 
question of how children learn mental state words, or rather, any kind of abstract 
word is equally important. Research in the past twenty years has provided 
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extensive evidence on the mechanisms by which children acquire new words (for 
reviews, see Bloom, 2000; Woodward & Markman, 1998). Although most of this 
research has focused on the learning of concrete words, some of the knowledge 
gained may apply to the learning of abstract words and, more specifically, to 
mental state terms.
Lila Gleitman and colleagues have suggested that the answer to the 
question of how children learn words that refer to abstract concepts is not 
especially complicated. 
Children’s first words are determined by the tools available for word 
learning. The true beginner can only try to observe elements in the world 
that systematically occur with the use of particular words. This leads to 
success in those cases in which the word meaning is concrete enough to be 
readily observable in the flow of events: mostly nouns, but also a 
heterogeneous set of other words. To learn less concrete (less observable 
terms), the learner needs other kinds of evidence: linguistic evidence, 
boostrapped from the previously acquired vocabulary of concrete words. 
(Fisher & Gleitman, 2002, p. 475)
The syntactic bootstrapping theory proposes then that children learn the 
meaning of abstract words via the linguistic information they can extract from the 
sentences that include those words, and from the cues they can obtain from the 
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meaning of other parts of the sentences. In fact, results from several studies 
indicate that children do use syntactic cues for determining word meanings 
(Fisher et al., 1994; Gleitman, 1990; Gillette et al, 1999; Hirsh-Pasek & 
Golinkoff, 1996; Waxman & Markow, 1995). 
One of the recent studies supporting this view is a “human simulation” 
study conducted by Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman and Lederer (1999). In one of 
their conditions, adults were shown silenced videotaped scenarios of mothers 
talking to their children and then were asked to guess what word the mother said 
at specific moments of the tape (whenever a beep was introduced). One 
interesting finding was that the participants were able to identify concrete verbs 
(e.g., throw or come) quite frequently but they were never able to guess mental 
verbs like think and know. However, in another condition, participants were 
provided with some syntactic information about the sentence being uttered but 
had no access to the videotapes. Surprisingly, participants performed better when 
trying to guess the abstract verbs than when trying to guess the concrete words. 
Gillette et al. (1999) argue that whereas the meanings of concrete words can be 
extracted from experience, the meanings of abstract words require syntactic cues. 
Several studies have revealed, however, that children can use social-
pragmatic cues to learn a word whose referent is absent (Akhtar & Tomasello, 
1996; Tomasello, Strosberg & Akhtar, 1996). For example, in one study, the 
experimenter said “Let’s find the toma.” The experimenter then looked for the 
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“toma” in a barn that was locked. Infants as young as 18 months learned the novel 
label without ever seeing the referent in association with the word (Tomasello et 
al., 1996). In another study, 24-month-olds learned novel labels for actions and 
objects they could not see at the time of labeling (Akhtar & Tomasello, 1996). 
These researchers claim that in non-ostensive contexts, that is, when the 
referent is not present and thus, cannot be pointed at or named, children can rely 
on their ability to understand the speaker’s referential intent. These findings are 
not necessarily in conflict with those of Gillette et al. (1999). Although the 
“toma” could not be seen in the barn task, it still referred to something concrete. 
Moreover, children could use linguistic information in the “toma” task because 
the new label was embedded in a sentence (e.g., “Let’s find the toma”), and that 
linguistic context might have helped them to identify the entity to which “toma” 
referred. Nonetheless, one could argue, based on these same data, that we need 
social-pragmatic cues in conjunction with linguistic information to achieve the 
goal of identifying the speaker’s referential intent, that is, identifying what exactly 
the speaker wants to refer to. These same cues also may be valuable for learning 
the meaning of abstract words. 
In an exploratory set of studies, Souza (2002) looked at the strategies 
parents utilize when introducing different kinds of abstract words (including 
mental states) versus when introducing concrete words. Two studies were 
conducted. In the first study, transcripts from CHILDES (Child Language Data 
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Exchange System) were examined to assess the frequency of particular abstract 
terms in children’s and adults’ speech and the strategies that parents used when 
discussing them. In the second study, 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds were videotaped with 
a parent at home. Parents were given a set of 6 different words during each of the 
two sessions and they were asked to use those words while interacting with the 
child (four of these words were abstract and two referred to concrete entities). 
Across both studies, the strategy most frequently used by parents was
associating the word with something that is concrete and visible. For example, 
when introducing an abstract word like "nothing," a parent might find a box in the 
room and say "What’s in the box? Look. Nothing is in the box now." The second 
most frequently used strategy was referring to a past, present or future event.  For 
example, when using the word "scared," one parent said, "Sometimes the cat likes 
to sit in the chair with us. Daddy doesn’t like that, does he? And then what does 
Daddy do? He scares her off, right? He goes... (mom claps hands). He scares her 
off. Do you think that makes her scared?" This finding was consistent with 
previous suggestions that parents try to facilitate the word learning process for 
their children (Nelson, 1973; Snow, 1977).
More research is needed, however, examining the process through which 
children become successful at learning mental state words and, more generally, 
abstract words. Some questions that remain unanswered are the following: do 
children rely on different strategies and cues for learning abstract words at 
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different points in development? What are the prerequisites for children to be able 
to succeed at this task? Do they include syntactic knowledge, as Gleitman and 
colleagues suggest, vocabulary size, or a cognitive ability such as the ability to 
make inferences about the speaker’s referential intent? Or is it a combination of 
linguistic knowledge, cognitive ability and social cues that enable the child to go 
from concrete to abstract? Finally, is there something special about the acquisition 
of one category of abstract words- mental states? These questions all point to 
interesting future directions for word learning research. Moreover, the entire 
discussion of when and how children acquire words that refer to mental states 
may contribute to a renewed interest in another very important discussion: that of 
the relationship between language and mind (Gentner & Golden-Meadow, 2003). 
Language and Mind
Researchers interested in cognitive and language development have been 
pursuing for decades the question of the exact nature of the relationship between 
language and mind. One of the several accounts entertained by these researchers 
is derived from the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that is, the idea that each language, 
specific to a given culture, shapes the way the members of its culture and 
linguistic community carve up the world. Whorf (1956) argued that speakers of 
the Hopi language had concepts of “time,” “space,” and “matter” that differed 
from those of English speakers. Moreover, he suggested that this difference had 
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an effect on their behavior. For example, Whorf claims that “a characteristic of 
Hopi behavior is the emphasis on preparation” (1956, p. 148). According to him, 
this form of behavior is intrinsically related to the pattern of counting time and the 
expression of time in the Hopi language. 
Whorf’s claims about the Hopi language have been challenged (Lakoff, 
1987) and, in fact, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has collected a considerable 
amount of opposition in past years. However, the question of the relationship 
between language and thought has reemerged and has been yielding interesting 
and important research findings (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). 
There are many different paths to be followed if one wants to pursue the 
language-cognition question or test the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Slobin (2003), 
for example, works within the framework of his “thinking for speaking” 
hypothesis which states that language has special effects on cognition only when 
there is a need for linguistic expression, in other words, when one is “thinking” 
with the purpose of “speaking.” 
Slobin’s most recent work is derived from the finding that different 
languages encode motion in different ways which, according to him, seems to 
have specific (and limited) effects on how speakers of different languages 
conceptualize motion events. For example, there are some languages (so called 
Satellite-languages) like English that tend to encode the path of motion through 
means of a particle or preposition -- a “satellite” (e.g., out) -- whereas other 
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languages (verb-framed languages) like Portuguese encode path of motion in a 
verb (e.g., exit). Moreover, according to Slobin (2003), what deserves attention is 
the fact that these languages differ in how they encode manner of motion. In 
English, manner is encoded in the verb itself as in his example “The dog ran into 
the house.” In verb-framed languages like Portuguese, manner is not encoded in 
the verb; it is encoded in another part of the sentence as in “O marido saiu de casa 
correndo” (‘The husband left the house by running’). Slobin proposes then that 
“online attention to manner has made it especially salient in S-language [satellite-
language] speakers’ conceptualizations of motion events” (p.164).
Melissa Bowerman and Soonja Choi are more interested in the effects of 
language on spatial reasoning. In Choi and Bowerman’s (1991) study contrasting 
English and Korean, they observed that in Korean, there are terms that represent 
“tight fit” versus “loose fit” spatial relationships and English does not make such 
a distinction. Another example that illustrates interesting cross-linguistic 
differences concerning spatial terms is that Portuguese does not make a 
distinction between “in” and “on” (the equivalent to both is “em”) whereas 
English has these two different semantic categories explicitly marked.
Based on this type of evidence and other cross-linguistic research and 
studies with spontaneous speech, Bowerman and Choi (2001) reach the following 
conclusion: what a language marks as support or containment is not determined 
by reality, but by the conventions present in each language. Consequently, 
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children’s conceptualizations of space may be influenced both by non-linguistic 
conceptual development and the semantic categories present in the input 
language. Their view is interactionist in the sense that cognition and language 
work side by side, that is, they both play a role in early word meaning. 
Dendre Genter, on the other hand, chooses to look at more general effects 
of language on cognition. She is interested in investigating how language can 
affect reasoning or representational abilities. Some of the evidence she presents 
comes from mapping tasks. In one of her studies, for example, she shows children 
two sets of objects (the experimenter’s and their own), then they see the 
experimenter hide a sticker under one of the objects in the experimenter’s set. 
Finally, they are asked to find the sticker which is said to be in the “same place” 
in their own set. In order to give a correct response, children had to take into 
consideration relational similarity, that is, to find the object of the same relative 
size and position in the experimenter’s set. Gentner and colleagues’ findings seem 
to indicate that relational language (e.g., hearing words like top or bottom) helps 
to improve children’s performance (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998) in this mapping 
task. Based on this kind of evidence, Gentner argues that “language is neither a 
lens through which one forever sees the world, nor a control tower for guiding 
cognition, but a set of tools with which to construct and manipulate 
representations” (Gentner, 2003, p.223). 
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As can be seen, the language-thought question is and will be, at least for 
the foreseeable future, generating a lot of work, especially because researchers in 
the field have not yet reached a consensus about the nature and direction of the 
relationship between language and thought. However, in spite of differences in 
theoretical perspectives, there is little disagreement about the value of research 
investigating this relationship in a wide range of domains: spatial reasoning, 
motion events, number, gender and in the domain that is of most interest to this 
paper, understanding of mental states and, more broadly, the mind. 
In particular, studies examining the relationship between language and 
theory of mind may provide valuable information and insights about children’s 
understanding of mental state terms. For this reason, a significant part of the 
literature reviewed in this paper will be focused on theory of mind development.
By reviewing this literature, I hope to clarify and emphasize the importance of 
studies looking at early language about the mind. It is important to note, however, 
that the majority of the studies reviewed here concentrate on false belief 
understanding, which is an important requirement for the complete acquisition of 
a theory of mind, but is not the only component. Before I discuss the different 
positions and findings concerning the relationship between language and theory of 
mind, I will describe how false belief understanding has been assessed by 
researchers in the field.
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Speaking and Theorizing about the mind
False belief understanding generally is tested in what has become known 
as false-belief tasks. There are, actually, several variants of the false belief task. 
For example, in one variant of the false belief task, the “unexpected content” task, 
the child is presented with a box with pictures of candy on it (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). The child is then asked about the contents of the box and later is 
shown that the box actually contains something else, for example, pencils. When 
asked to report their original idea about the contents of the box, children under the 
age of 4 claim that they knew there were pencils in the box and predict that other 
people will know there are pencils there. 
In another variant of the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; De 
Villiers & De Villiers, 2000), a confederate shows the child an object (e.g., a 
sticker) and puts it in location A. The confederate then leaves the room and the 
experimenter suggests moving the object to location B. The child is then asked 
“When …. (the confederate) comes back, where will he/she look for the object?” 
Again, 3-year-olds consistently respond that the confederate will look in location 
B, even though he/she had not witnessed the change of location. These findings 
suggest that before age 4, children have difficulty in attributing a false belief to 
themselves and others.
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There is robust evidence of correlations between false belief reasoning and 
language measures. For example, Happé (1995) found that success at false-belief 
tasks was significantly correlated with verbal ability as measured by the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS). Moreover, individuals with autism require a 
higher level of verbal ability than typically developing children in order to pass 
false-belief tasks (Happé, 1995). Jenkins & Astington (1996) used the Test of 
Early Language Development (TELD) to provide a measure of syntactic and 
semantic abilities in children between 2 and 5 years of age and a sentence 
memory measure of the Stanford-Binet to assess verbal memory. Success at false 
belief tasks was significantly correlated with children’s general language ability 
and verbal memory. 
Cutting and Dunn (1999) were more interested in the effect of family 
background on the development of a theory of mind; however, they also found 
evidence that receptive vocabulary as measured by the BPVS and narrative 
expressive language ability were associated with false-belief understanding. 
Farrar and Maag (2002) found that vocabulary and grammatical complexity as 
measured by the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) at 2 
years of age were strong predictors of performance on different theory of mind 
tasks at age 4 (appearance-reality; false belief and representational change). 
Because all of these studies are correlational, it not only is unclear whether there 
is a causal relationship and what the direction of any such relationship would be,
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but it is also entirely possible that a third variable is responsible for this 
relationship (e.g., some might argue general intelligence). Studies with special 
populations might provide additional insights. 
Peterson and Siegal (1998) provide evidence for similarities between 
autistic and deaf children from hearing families in the development of a theory of 
mind. Both groups performed significantly worse at false-belief tasks than 
typically developing 4-year-olds. Peterson and Siegal (1998) argue that this 
similarity stems from a reality shared by autistic and deaf children of hearing 
parents: they are both deprived of talk about mental states early in development. 
Deaf children of hearing parents get little language input overall, particularly if 
they are being “orally” trained. Moreover, the few words they may acquire most 
likely refer to concrete things. With regard to the autistic children, the argument is 
that their difficulties in the social realm as well as their limited pragmatic skills 
may contribute to diminished talk about the mind early in life. This concern with 
the role of early talk about the mind in theory of mind development seems to 
resonate with previous work by Judy Dunn and colleagues (Dunn, Brown & 
Beardsall, 1991), which suggests that early family talk about emotions is 
correlated with children’s later ability to recognize emotions (at age 6).
More recently, Cicchetti et al. (2003) argued that we may find support for 
this hypothesis in yet another population: maltreated children. Their results 
indicate a correlation between child maltreatment and delays in theory of mind 
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development. One possible explanation for such a relationship is that parents of 
maltreated children are less likely to address their child’s internal experience due 
to their restricted sensitivity and reduced levels of empathy towards their children. 
Consequently, these children may also be deprived of early communication 
promoting the development of theory of mind. Although this is an interesting 
claim, more research on the exact nature and content of the verbal interactions of 
these families needs to be conducted. 
Other researchers, however, have focused their attention on other aspects 
of language development. For example, the de Villiers are more interested in the 
role of syntax. They claim that the syntax of complementation is an important pre-
requisite for the acquisition of a theory of mind (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; 
2003). Some sentences in English, like those including mental states, require an 
embedded proposition or complement. For example, the sentence “I think he’s 
coming for dinner” includes the mental state verb think which demands an 
embedded complement: “he’s coming for dinner” in this case. Through the use of 
embedded complements, one can express a belief that may actually be very 
different from someone else’s belief or even reality. 
The de Villiers (2000) gathered evidence from a longitudinal study with 
children from ages 3 to 4 which indicated that the strongest predictor of success at 
false-belief tasks was production of sentential complements. Additionally, they 
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presented empirical data from deaf children suggesting that they are significantly 
delayed in two different kinds of false-belief tasks.
In one task (the sticker-finding game), 23 deaf children (aged 4 to 9) had 
to find a sticker that was hidden by an experimenter in one of several boxes. They 
received clues from a confederate (who had been blindfolded when the sticker 
was hidden) and from the experimenter who actually knew where the sticker was. 
Only 47.8% of these orally-taught deaf children chose the box to which the 
experimenter (the “knower”) had pointed more often than would be expected by 
chance. Moreover, the average age of the deaf children who succeeded at this task 
was 7.31 years. 
In another task (the “what face?” game), another group of profoundly deaf 
children (aged 5:2 to 10:1) were presented with a set of pictures showing a 
character looking into a familiar container that had unexpected content (e.g., a 
crayon box that has a key inside). Participants were then asked to predict whether 
the character was surprised or not by choosing the picture of a face with the right 
facial expression and placing it on the character’s blank face. 
Surprisingly, only 32% of participants mastered this task, which seemed to 
indicate that this less verbal task was even harder for deaf children than the verbal 
one. It is important to note that the scores of normally hearing children in the 
standard verbal tasks were significantly correlated with their score on this less 
verbal “what face?” task (r (26) = +.61, p < .001).  More importantly, the best 
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predictor of success for deaf children in both tasks was again mastery of 
complementation syntax. In summary, De Villiers & De Villiers (2000) argue that 
deaf children tend to have difficulties with the false belief task before they acquire 
complementation syntax and the direction of causality is that language is 
determining false belief success.
Yet another group of researchers, however, has focused on semantics and 
the process through which children come to understand the meaning of mental 
state words. For example, Barstch and Wellman (1995) tracked the process 
through which young children gradually incorporate mental state words into their 
productive vocabulary by analyzing CHILDES data. One of their interesting 
findings is that children acquire desire words before belief words like think and 
know, and that these belief words start emerging in children’s vocabularies right 
after their second birthdays. Another example is the work of Moore, Pure & 
Furrow (1990) who found that children’s competence with verbs expressing 
different levels of certainty like think and know correlate with their performance 
on theory of mind tasks (false-belief, appearance-reality and representational 
change). 
Marilyn Shatz has been working for a number of years on the acquisition 
of mental state words and more importantly, she has been interested in the 
question of  when young children start displaying a clear understanding of mental 
states, or rather, when they start making reference to a “true mental state” (Shatz 
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et al., 1983; Shatz, 1994). More recently, Shatz and her colleagues (2003) have 
investigated the possibility that differences in the explicitness with which 
languages express a concept of false belief has an effect on children’s 
understanding of false belief. Some languages, like Turkish and Puerto Rican 
Spanish, have explicit terms for false belief (e.g., “san” in Turkish and “creer-se” 
in Puerto Rican Spanish) whereas other languages like English and Brazilian 
Portuguese do not have words that explicitly convey a “false belief.” Their results 
suggest that there is an effect of lexical explicitness on children’s false belief 
performance but it is a “local” effect. Having the explicit term for false belief was 
correlated with improved performance only when the task questions included the 
explicit term. Therefore, Shatz et al. (2003) remind us that caution is needed when 
making claims about the nature of the relationship between language and theory 
of mind. 
It is possible that all of these different aspects of language may play a role 
in theory of mind development. However, what remains problematic about 
research investigating the possible link between language and theory of mind is 
that most, if not all of the relevant studies provide only correlational data and use 
false belief tasks as a proxy for ToM. Based on the current evidence, claims about 
a causal relationship between language and theory of mind are inappropriate, as 
are claims about the direction of this relationship.
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Perhaps before one can establish the true nature of the relationship 
between language and ToM, it will be necessary to take one step back and 
dedicate more attention to each of the language components proposed to have an 
impact on theory of mind. For example, one should look at children’s 
understanding of mental state words alone. Once it becomes clear how and when 
this understanding develops, we will be able to make more inferences about how 
it may affect children’s understanding of the mind. Moreover, the question of 
whether the developmental pattern towards such an understanding is universal 
also deserves attention. For example, evidence that the process is not universal 
might point to linguistic and cultural influences on the development of an 
understanding of the mind. Cross-linguistic studies may prove to be particularly 
instrumental in the process of finding answers to this question.
Different Languages, Different Theories?
An important source of evidence for researchers interested in the role of 
language in children’s understanding of mind is cross-linguistic work. The 
question that needs to be asked is whether children follow the same 
developmental pattern across different languages and cultures. Importantly, 
differences in the expression of mental states across languages could have effects 
on children’s understanding of the mental world and, possibly, on the time frame 
during which they acquire a theory of mind. Although recent studies have 
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revealed some important findings, there is still an enormous need for more cross-
linguistic work.
Tardif and Wellman (2000), for example, were interested in possible 
differences between Chinese- and English-speaking children in the developmental 
pattern through which they acquire a theory of mind. They argue that the 
comparison between Chinese and English is interesting for the following reasons: 
a significant part of language about the mind consists of verbs (e.g., know and 
think) and, unlike English-speaking children, Mandarin-speaking children are 
exposed to approximately equal numbers of nouns and verbs early in 
development. Secondly, syntax of complementation in Mandarin and Cantonese is 
simpler than in English. If mastery of predicate complementation is indeed a pre-
requisite for theory-of-mind development (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000, 2003), 
then one should expect that speakers of Chinese would have an advantage. 
Additionally, some of the verbs used to convey mental states have more 
than one meaning. For example, xiang32 could be translated into think but also 
into “want to do something.” The question Tardif and Wellman (2000) ask is 
whether having the same word to indicate both a belief and a desire could have 
any effect on children’s progression towards a psychology that includes not only 
desires but also beliefs. Researchers have argued that American children progress 
from a theory focused on desires to a theory focused on beliefs (Bartsch & 
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Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 1990). Should we expect the same pattern among 
Chinese children?
Tardif and Wellman (2000) recorded everyday conversations of 10 
Mandarin-speaking children over a period of 6 months and 8 Cantonese-speaking 
children over a period of 1 year. The transcripts were analyzed for utterances that 
contained words that referred to mental states. The researchers found that even 
though Chinese-speaking children showed a similar developmental pattern to 
English-speaking children in the acquisition of vocabulary referring to mental 
states, that is, they produced words that referred to desires before they produced 
words that referred to beliefs, the Chinese children used desire terms much earlier 
and used “thinking” terms less frequently. These findings seem to indicate that 
there are no differences in the “overall sequence;” however, there are differences 
in the time frame during which children acquire specific mental state words. 
Tardiff and Wellman (2000) entertain possible explanations for some of 
these differences. For example, what could explain the fact that English-speaking 
children use words referring to “thinking” more frequently than Mandarin- and 
Cantonese-speaking children? One possibility is that parents of Chinese-speaking 
children simply do not make many references to “thinking” early on. Another 
possibility is that a more complex syntactic structure is required when xiang3 is 
used to express “thinking” than when this same verb is used to express “wanting.”
2 Tone contours are indicated in Mandarin by the numbers 1-4 at the end of each syllable.
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Examination of naturalistic data has contributed greatly to our 
understanding of the acquisition of mental state words (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995) and the Tardif and Wellman paper is no exception. However, Tardif and 
Wellman (2000) only tested ToM abilities by looking at mental state word use, 
and therefore, they cannot make any claims concerning actual conceptual 
differences. In addition, the question of what specific aspect(s) of the Chinese 
language affects this time frame of theory-of-mind development remains 
unanswered. 
Lee, Olson and Torrance (1999) were interested in possible differences 
between Chinese- and English-speaking children in performance on false belief 
tasks. Another important distinction between Chinese and English, these authors 
point out, is that Chinese possesses verbs that explicitly denote “thinking 
truthfully” and verbs that denote “thinking falsely.” Lee et al.’s (1999) goal was 
to test the effect of this particular linguistic difference on children’s performance 
in false-belief tasks. 
In order to test this effect, participants were assigned to one of three 
conditions. Each condition consisted of the same three false-belief tasks: an 
unexpected content task; a variation of the Maxi task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
which involved telling participants a story about a boy named Maxi who  puts his 
candy in a basket and whose mother moves it to a box without his knowledge; and 
a third task in which children listened to a story about a mother cat and her family 
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and then reported the cat’s belief about the identity of another character. The only 
difference among the three conditions concerned the type of verb used in the 
questioning part of the three tasks. The verb xiang is considered more “neutral” 
and can be translated into either think or believe. Yiwei, on the other hand, 
indicates that the belief may be false. Dang is even less neutral because it literally 
applies to instances in which there is a false belief. There were two important 
findings. The first was that Chinese-speaking children seem to follow the same 
developmental pattern in false-belief understanding as Western children do, that 
is, they display increasing success at false-belief tasks between 3 and 5 years of 
age. However, the second important finding was that performance at these false-
belief tasks is affected by the use of these different belief verbs. Participants 
performed significantly better when the verbs yiwei and dang were used, which 
suggests that children’s performance in false belief tasks may be influenced by the 
language used during questioning.
Shatz et al. (2003) also provide a test of how differences in the way false 
belief is conveyed in particular languages may affect performance in false-belief 
tasks. As described in the previous chapter, they did so comparing four different 
languages: two of them, Turkish and Puerto Rican Spanish, have verbs that 
explicitly denote a false belief whereas the other two, Brazilian Portuguese and 
English, do not. Once again, the effect was local: children from the first group 
performed better in the false-belief tasks but only when the explicit term was 
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being used. These crosslinguistic studies suggest that influences of language on 
cognition, at least with regard to false belief, are relatively restricted.
An interesting feature of Shatz et al.’s (2003) study is that linguistic 
differences cut across culture differences. They were able to group these four 
languages using the criterion of having or not having a verb to express “false-
belief,” with the result that Puerto Rican Spanish and Turkish were grouped 
together and contrasted with the second group, Brazilian Portuguese and English. 
One could argue that speakers of Brazilian Portuguese have far more in common, 
in terms of cultural background, with Puerto Rican Spanish speakers than with 
English speakers. This study thus represented an opportunity to isolate possible 
linguistic effects from cultural confounds (Bloom & Keil, 2001).
Shatz et al. (2003) remind us, however, that there are linguistic similarities 
between Puerto Rican Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese, and this is a fact worthy 
of attention. For example, they both have a specific verb to indicate performing 
the action of thinking as in “What are you thinking about right now?” and that 
verb is pensar for both languages. In fact, another potential and interesting cross-
linguistic comparison would be one between Portuguese- and English-speaking 
children, given some peculiarities of the Portuguese language regarding certain 
mental state verbs, in particular, verbs like think and know. 
In Portuguese, the English verb know can be translated into two different 
words. According to Ganho & McGovern (2004), conhecer indicates familiarity 
36
with an object, concept or person whereas saber is used to indicate memorized 
knowledge. For example, if one wants to say “I know Math” in Portuguese, one 
will say “Eu sei Matemática.” However, if one wants to express “being 
acquainted with someone,” as in “I know Melissa,” one will use the verb 
conhecer: “Eu conheço a Melissa” (see also Prista, 1966 and Fernández, 1965) 
The word think also can be translated into two different words, depending 
on whether one wants to refer to the actual process of thinking (pensar) or 
whether one wants to express an opinion (achar). Fernández (1965, p. 45) 
provides three examples of think as referring to the process of thinking (in which 
pensar is used and achar is not appropriate): a) “Pense antes de falar” [Think 
before you speak]; b) “Sem pensar” [Without thinking]; and c) “Ela está pensando 
nas férias” [She’s thinking about her vacation]. Achar can be used in different 
contexts (Ferreira, 1986): a) find by accident or by searching (e.g., Eu achei o 
livro [I found the book]); b) to suppose, to judge (e.g., Ele achou sua presenca 
desagradavel [He found/judged  his presence unpleasant]) and finally, c) to think, 
to believe (e.g., Acho que ele não vem) [I think he is not coming].
There is little work examining whether these cross-linguistic differences in 
mental state words are associated with differences in the acquisition of mental 
state terms. One particular study (Bassano, 1985) investigated French children’s 
understanding of savoir ( know) and croire (think). Although Bassano’s study did 
not include any cross-linguistic comparisons, it provided valuable information 
37
about the understanding of these mental state terms among children whose native 
language is not English3. Participants were introduced to four different dolls and 
each had a box in front containing an object (either a fish or a bird). Doll #1 had 
her eyes open and had a fish inside the box; doll #2 was blindfolded and had a 
bird inside the box; doll # 3 had open eyes and had a bird; and doll # 4 was 
blindfolded and had a fish. The task was to indicate which of the dolls was likely 
to say the following statements:
a. “I know that I have a fish”
b. “I know that I do not have a fish”
c. “I do not know if I have a fish”
d. “I think that I have a fish”
Results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old French-speaking children have a 
clear understanding of savoir (know) when it is used in the affirmative but they 
showed some difficulties with the two negative sentences. In particular, 60% of 
the subjects were not able to interpret the “I know that I do not have a fish” 
correctly. 
3 French has several features in common with Portuguese because they are both Romance 
languages. For example, French makes the same distinctions that Portuguese makes between 
“knowing a person” (“connaitre”) and “knowing a fact (“savoir”); and between “thinking about 
something” (“penser”) and “expressing an opinion” (“croire”). However, these distinctions were 
not investigated in this particular study.
38
The confusion seemed to derive from a tendency of these children to 
interpret the negation as being assigned to the verb know, that is, they interpreted
the sentence as “I do not know that I have a fish.” Another interesting finding was 
that children’s performance in the “think” trial was far below their performance in 
the “know” affirmative trial. Bassano (1985) argued that most 4- and 5-year-olds 
treat the mental state term think as having the properties of certainty and it is only 
later that children are able to understand that think involves a certain level of 
indeterminacy.  
Far more cross-linguistic work is needed. There are very few studies of 
mental state and theory of mind development with children in countries other than 
the United States (c.f., Vinden, 1996; Avis & Harris, 1991); therefore, our 
knowledge of non-English-speaking children’s developing understanding of 
mental states and theory-of-mind is limited. For instance, research on false belief 
understanding and theory-of-mind in Brazil is scarce. 
In one study, Roazzi and Santana (1999) tested 4- and 5-year-old Brazilian 
children in an adapted version of a false-belief task. The task consisted of 
presenting the child with three dolls that were introduced to the child as students 
in a school and a fourth doll who represented the teacher. One of the three student 
dolls had a tomato head and was called “Tomatinha,” another had a carrot head 
and was called “Cenourinha;” the third one had a banana head was called 
“Bananinha.” “Tomatinha” always brought tomatoes for lunch; “Cenourinha” 
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always brought carrots and “Bananinha” always had bananas. A confederate left 
the room with the three dolls while the experimenter suggested that they replace 
“Bananinha’s” lunch with bubble gum. Then the child was asked three questions:
1. What does (the confederate) think (“pensa”) “Bananinha” has in her lunch box?
2. What does “Bananinha” think (“pensa”) is in her lunch box?
3. What does “Bananinha” have in her lunch box?
Roazzi and Santana (1999) found that only 32% of the 4-year-olds in their 
study passed this false-belief task whereas 98% of the 5-year-olds were 
successful. These results could be taken to suggest that Brazilian children are 
delayed in the development of false-belief understanding if compared to British 
children who participated in the original studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, confounding variables could be affecting the 
results in the Roazzi and Santana study (1999). For example, they used dolls 
because one of the goals of the study was to test whether using inanimate actors 
rather than animate actors had any effect on children’s performance in a false-
belief task. However, the dolls had an unusual appearance and seemed to be 
highly attractive to the children and they may have been too much of a distraction 
for the younger children. In addition, children were presented with four dolls, 
which could have added to the complexity of the task. These facts could also 
explain why the researchers were unable to run the study with 3-year-olds, who 
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seemed to pay little or no attention to the task itself. Studies with other variants of 
the false-belief task are necessary in order for us to reach any conclusion about 
the pattern in theory-of-mind development in Brazilian children.
In fact, results from a previous study seem to contradict Roazzi and 
Santana’s (1999) findings. Dias (1993) tested false belief understanding in 
orphanage children as well as children from low and middle SES families in 
Brazil using adaptations of three false belief tasks: the “Sally-Ann task,” the 
“unexpected content” task and the “sticker-finding game.” Participants were 
shown a doll called Silvia who had a marble in her basket. They were then told 
that Silvia was going to leave the room and go for a walk but would leave her 
basket in the room. Another doll called Ana was introduced to children. Ana 
removed the marble from the basket and put it inside a cardboard box on the table. 
The experimenter asked the child where Silvia would look for the marble when 
she came back. 
In the second false belief task, children were shown a box of “ping-pong” 
bubble gum box(a popular bubble gum in Brazil). They were asked what was 
inside the box and then shown that the box actually contained pencils. Children 
were also asked what a third person (a classmate who was not in the room) would 
say about what was inside the box. In the third task, a confederate put a “ping-
pong” bubble gum underneath one of three cardboard boxes, then left the room. 
The experimenter told children that they should move the bubble gum to another 
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box. After doing that, children were asked where the confederate would look for 
the bubble gum when he/she came back. Although orphanage children had scores 
below chance at ages 4 and 5, children from low and middle SES performed
above chance at the three tasks at all three ages (4, 5 and 6). These results suggest 
that Brazilian children do not differ from U.S. and European children in their 
performance on false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Gopnik & Astington, 
1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
Nevertheless, there is other evidence that could point to differences in
Brazilian children’s developing understanding of mental states. Results from 
another study (Roazzi & Arcoverde, 1997) seem to suggest that it is not until age 
5 that Brazilian children are able to make a distinction between factive verbs 
(verbs whose complements must be true) like know, versus counterfactive verbs 
(verbs whose complements must be untrue) like make-believe. Children were 
presented with a series of statements, each including a factive verb (know or find
out) or a counterfactive verb (make believe or make someone believe). The child 
was then asked two questions, one designed to test the truth value children 
attributed to the complement and one designed to test the level of certainty 
children attributed to the target verb. For example, a child would hear the 
sentence “Paulo knows that Bruna is playing with her dog.” The first question 
would be “So, is Bruna playing with her dog?” and the child could answer “yes,” 
“you can’t tell,” or “no.” The second question would be “If Paulo knows, is Paulo 
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sure that Bruna is playing with her dog? Or is Paulo not sure that Bruna is playing 
with her dog?”
Three- and four-year-olds still had trouble with the counterfactive verbs, 
treating them as if they were factives. However, there is a possible confound in
this study as well. The counterfactive verb that presented the most difficulties to 
children at all ages was make someone believe. As the authors themselves point 
out, this is not a very common expression in young Brazilian children’s lexicon. 
Therefore, it is very likely that these results were caused by children’s 
unfamiliarity with this expression. Additionally, it remains unclear whether a 
potential delay in their understanding of counterfactive verbs could have an effect 
on children’s performance in theory-of-mind tasks.
One could argue that there are many difficulties associated with cross-
linguistic research and that is why there are only a limited number of cross-
linguistic studies. There is a significant increase in expenses when one is 
conducting cross-linguistic research. In addition, there is the difficulty of 
establishing relationships with researchers in other countries as well as concerns 
about possible confounds. However, if researchers in the field truly want to 
establish whether children’s understanding of mental state words and theory of 
mind both involve a developmental process that is universal, and if they want to 
investigate the relationship between language and cognition about the mind, there 
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needs to be more attention devoted to research conducted in other countries as 
well as research comparing different linguistic communities. 
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III. Study 1
The general purpose of the research presented here was to investigate 
children’s developing understanding of two mental state terms: think and know. It 
is important to note, however, that think and know can be used in different 
contexts and, therefore, can imply different senses. For instance, know can be 
used to express sympathy, to express “knowing how to do something,” or being 
acquainted with somebody. Additionally, know can be used in contrast to think to 
indicate different degrees of certainty. 
Study 1 focuses specifically on children’s developing understanding of the 
distinction between think and know as indicating two different degrees of 
certainty. More specifically, the purpose of this study was to test the assumption 
that children achieve an understanding of this distinction between think and know
at an earlier time than suggested by previous research Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; 
Miscione et al., 1978; Moore et al., 1989). There is consistent evidence suggesting 
that this understanding is not achieved until the age of 4 (e.g., Moore et al., 1989) 
but the study reported here was innovative in two important respects: (a) it 
required children to reflect on their own mental states and not on those of a third 
person, and (b) it required children to reflect on different types or modalities of 
evidence (seeing an object/how it works, feeling, hearing, inference) as potential 
sources of knowledge. It was expected that, by introducing these changes to the 
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task, an incipient understanding of the distinction between think and know could 
be revealed before age 4. 
Method
Participants
Forty-eight English-speaking children participated in this study. They 
were divided equally into three different age groups: 2½-, 3 ½- and 4 ½ - year-old 
children (8 boys and 8 girls in each age group)4. English-speaking participants 
were recruited using a database maintained at the Children’s Research Lab at the 
University of Texas. Parents with children of the appropriate age for the study 
were contacted with a letter that explains the goals of the study and describes 
what would be required of them and their child if they chose to participate. 
Several days after receiving the letter, the parents were called and asked whether 
they had additional questions and whether or not they were interested in having 
their child participate in the study. 
The consent form for the study included a set of five questions aimed at 
assessing the participants’ socio-economic status (SES; see Appendix A). These 
questions were extracted from a questionnaire used by the Universidade de São 
Paulo to assess SES. One question was excluded from the original questionnaire 
because it concerned family income. It was expected that some parents would feel 
uncomfortable in answering such a question. Answers to the first question 
concerning family size were not considered in the final calculation because they 
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were relevant only in conjunction with the information about family income. 
Therefore, the SES scores were based on parents’ answers to the four remaining 
questions of the questionnaire. The SES scores revealed that participants were, on 
average, upper-middle class.
Materials and Procedure
At the Children’s Research Lab, both parent and child were asked to come 
to a room and sit at a table with an experimenter. 
In order to have children familiarized with the format of the test question, 
the session began with a warm-up task. Initially, children heard the following 
instructions: “We’re going to be playing some games today. I’ll show you some 
things and then I’ll ask you some questions. Sometimes you know what these 
things are and sometimes you don’t. So you just may need to guess. But there are 
no wrong answers. Is that okay?” Then they were presented with three different 
objects, one at a time: a red pen, a ball and a cup. After a child was given the red 
pen, the experimenter said:
- “Look at this. What is it? Yes, it’s a pen (if child says that it is a pen). Is this pen 
blue or is this pen red?”
After the child provided an answer, the experimenter gave him/her the ball 
and said: 
4 The three age groups ranged from 2;6 to 2;11, from 3;6 to 3;11 and from 4;6 to 4;11.
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- “Now, let’s think about what we can do with some objects, what we can do with 
some things. What is this? Yes, it’s a ball (if child says “ball”). Let’s talk about 
what we can do with a ball. Do you throw a ball or do you eat a ball?”
The third training trial consisted of showing the child a cup and then 
saying:
- “Now, let’s talk about how we figure out things. Sometimes we see stuff and 
sometimes we smell stuff. Now, what is this? (after showing the cup). Yes, it’s a 
cup (if child says “cup”). Do you see that it’s a cup or do you smell that it’s a 
cup?”
The training trials were designed to familiarize children with a forced 
choice task that involved making a judgment about qualities associated with an 
object. During all three training trials, the child had to make a choice between two 
different properties or two different attributes of the same object. The first trial 
was asking them to reflect on the visible property of a pen, that is, its color; the 
second and third trials required some abstract reasoning from the child: what 
potentially can be done with a ball and how to figure out that an object is a cup. 
Children’s performance in this training task was also used as a test of 
whether they had difficulties with the forced-choice type of questioning. If 
children’s performance in the test trials was found to be poor, one could argue 
that their “failure” could be attributed to difficulties with the task itself and not to 
their understanding of the distinction between know and think. Therefore, only 
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children who succeeded, that is, provided a correct answer in at least two of the 
three training trials, were included in our analyses. Only one child failed more 
than one training trial and, as a result, was excluded from our analyses. 
The experimental portion of the session consisted of presenting the child 
with a series of different toys and objects, in a set of tasks in which the certainty 
about the identity of the objects varied. The child was then asked questions about 
what the objects were and how certain she/he was about what they were. For 
example, a child was shown a bag with an object inside that could be felt but not 
seen and then asked “What is it?” or “What could it be?”; after the child provided 
an answer, the experimenter asked “Do you know that this is a….. or do you think
that this is a…..?” Both target words were equally stressed and the intonation was 
kept constant during all trials. Then the child was given a bag containing an object 
that could be both seen and felt and again asked what the object was, followed by 
the “know versus think” question. During the other four games, the same kind of 
questioning was used but the kind of evidence presented to the child varied (see 
Appendix B). In summary, each of the five games included one trial during which 
children either saw the object or they saw how it worked and one trial during 
which children did not have sufficient evidence to claim certainty about the 
identity of the object, that is, they did not see the object or how it worked. For the 
purpose of clarity, the former will be called the “more evidence” trial and the 
latter will be called the “less evidence” trial.
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The order of the words know and think in the test question was 
counterbalanced across games and across children but kept constant within a
game. For example, in the bag game described above, half of the children heard 
know first and half heard think first but a given child would hear think first for 
both the “more evidence” trials and the “less evidence” trials of that particular 
game. The games were also presented in two alternate orders: a) cards, boxes, 
bags, novel object, gift or b) gift, novel object, bags, boxes, cards. The order of 
trials within each game, that is, whether the game began with the “more evidence”
trial or the “less evidence” trial was also counterbalanced, with two exceptions. In 
the light bulb game, it was necessary to start with the “less evidence” scenario 
because the object no longer was ambiguous once its function was demonstrated. 
In the card game, it was necessary to start with the “more evidence” scenario and 
show the “dog” card first to set the context for the child to infer the identity of the 
other card. 
When asked what the target object was, participants occasionally said “I 
don’t know” or simply shrugged their shoulders and refused to answer. One 2-
year-old boy, when asked about the novel object, seemed to struggle to find an 
answer but, when nothing came to mind, simply said “It’s a mystery!” If children 
failed to provide an answer even after prompting with “What could it be”?, the 
experimenter offered some possibilities. For example, during the novel object 
game, the experimenter would say: “Well, could this be a ball? Or could it be ice-
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cream? Or a pineapple?” (answers that had been given by children who 
participated during the piloting phase). The experimenter continued to offer 
suggestions until the child agreed that it could be one of those things. After the 
child said “yes” to one of these options, for example, a ball, the experimenter 
introduced the test question “Do you know that this is a ball or do you think that 
this is a ball?” Sometimes, children provided an answer that was not specific 
enough. For example, in the bag game, children would place their hand inside the 
bag and say “it’s a toy” or “it’s a stuffed animal.” In such cases, the experimenter 
asked “What kind of toy?” or “What kind of animal?”
Results
The goal of the test trials was to determine whether 2 ½-, 3 ½- and 4 ½-
year-old children can make a conceptual distinction between the words know and 
think and, specifically, whether they can understand the differing degrees of 
certainty associated with each. I predicted there would be a significant difference 
among the three age groups. 4 ½ year olds would perform significantly better than 
the 3 ½- and the 2 ½-year olds. However, I expected this task to be easier than the 
ones used in prior research (Johnson & Maratsos, 1977; Moore et al., 1989) and 
thus, I predicted that children would perform successfully at this task before age 
4.
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Coding was based on the following criteria: every child got a score of 0-2 
for each game, that is, they received a score of 2 if they gave the correct answer in 
both “more evidence” and “less evidence” trials, a score of 1 if they provided a 
correct answer to only of the two trials and a score of 0 if they gave incorrect 
answers in both trials. When their scores in the “more evidence” and the “less 
evidence” trials were combined, the maximum possible score was 10 (maximum 
of 2 for each of the 5 games). Children’s scores in the “more evidence” trials were 
compared to their scores in the “less evidence” trials and in that case, their scores 
ranged from 0 to 5 for each type of trial (there was one “more evidence” trial and 
one “less evidence” trial in each of the five games). In the “less evidence” trials, 
children got a score of 1 if the answer was “I think this is a…” and a score of 0 if 
the answer was “I know this a….”or any other answer. In the “more evidence” 
trials, when they could see what the object was or what it was used for, children 
were assigned a score of 0 if the answer was “I think” or anything other than 
“know” and a score of 1 if the answer was “I know.” Data were coded to 
determine the relative performance on “less evidence” and “more evidence” trials, 
that is, whether children were giving correct answers in both types of trials (more 
evidence and less evidence) or whether their performance differed according to 
the kind of information with which they were presented.
The results will be described as follows. First, preliminary analyses which 
were conducted to test for influences of gender and counterbalancing will be 
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presented. The analyses of primary interest will be discussed next. The goal of 
these analyses was to identify whether relative performance on the “more 
evidence” and on the “less evidence” trials varied with age. Additionally, analyses 
were conducted to test whether overall performance in any particular game was 
especially poor, which could indicate that the game presented greater difficulties 
to the children. These analyses will be presented last.
In order to test for the influences of gender, a 3 x 2 ANOVA was 
conducted with age (2 ½, 3 ½, 4 ½) and gender as between-subjects factors. There 
was no main effect of gender, F (1, 42) = 1.26, p= 0.27, nor did it interact 
significantly with age, F (2, 42)= 0.54, p= 0.58. In order to test for possible 
influences of counterbalancing, three 3 x 2 ANOVAs were each conducted with 
age and one of the following three variables entered as between-subject factors: 
order of games, order of think and know, and order of type of trial (more evidence 
x less evidence). They revealed no main effect of order of games, F (1, 42)= 0.13, 
p= 0.72, no main effect of word order (think x know), F (1, 42)= 0.05, p= 0.83 and 
no main effect of order of type of trial, F (1, 42)= 0.12, p= 0.91. None of these 
variables had a significant interaction with age. Therefore, the resulting analyses 
were collapsed across gender, order of games, order of think and know, and 
finally, order of type of evidence.
The goals of the primary analysis were to examine the scores in the “more 
evidence” trials and the “less evidence”  trials in each game and to test whether 
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children’s performance on each trial varied with age. The mean scores (out of 5 
possible for each type of trial) are presented in Table 1 below. As can be seen, the 
means were higher for 4-year-olds, particularly, in the “more evidence” trials.
Table 1
Mean scores per trial at each age
Age Trial Mean SE
more evid 1.94 0.32
2 yrs less evid 2.37 0.41
more evid 3.37 0.32
3 yrs less evid 2.37 0.41
more evid 4.75 0.32
4 yrs less evid 2.75 0.41
In order to test whether these differences were significant, a two- way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with age (2 ½, 3 ½, 4 ½) as the 
between-subject factor and type of trial (more evidence, less evidence) as the 
within-subject factor. A significant main effect of type of trial was found, F (1, 
45) = 7.51, p= .009 as well as a significant main effect of age, F (2, 45) = 10.06, 
p < 0.01. Additionally, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between type 
of trial and age, F (2, 45)= 5.15, p = 0.01. Pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between the mean score at ages 2 (M= 2.16) and 4 
(M=3.75), p < 0.001. Additionally, at age 4, there was a significant difference 
between the evidence (M= 4.75) and the less evidence trials (M= 2.75), p= 0.001 
(see Figure 1). 
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In order to test children’s performance against chance, three t-tests were 
performed separately for each age group. These analyses were based on children’s 
overall scores with the “more evidence” and “less evidence” scores combined (out 
of a total possible score of 10). The results suggested that at ages 2 and 3, 
children’s mean scores did not differ from chance (ps =0.25 and 0.12) but at age 
4, their performance was significantly above chance (p < 0.01). Interestingly, their 
performance in the “more evidence” trials was significantly above chance 
(M=4.75) but not their performance in the “less evidence” trials (M= 2.75).
A d’ analysis was conducted to examine whether there were biases in 
children’s responses, that is, whether they were more likely to overextend think to 
“more evidence” contexts or more likely to overextend know to “less evidence” 
contexts. Hit rates, false alarm rates5 and d’ values were calculated for the “more 
5 The false alarm for the “know” trials refers to the instances of children responding with “know” 
when they should be responding with “think” and the false alarm for the “think” trials refer to 
instances of children responding with “think” when they should be responding with “know.”
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evidence” (know) and the “less evidence” (think) trials at each age (see Table 2). 
The results were in parallel with the results of the analyses discussed above. The 
d’ values for the 2- and the 3-year olds were closer to 0, indicating that their 
performance was at chance. The d’ value for the 4-year olds in the “more 
evidence” trials (d’= 2.29) was higher than the d’ value in the “less evidence”
trials, suggesting a greater sensitivity to contexts during which children have 
visual access to what the object is or how it works. Additionally, the false alarm 
rates at age 4 for the “more evidence” trials were higher (M=0.26) than the false 
alarm rates for the “less evidence” trials, which suggests that children were more 
likely to respond with know in the “less evidence” (think) trials than they were to 
respond with think in the “more evidence” (know) trials. 
Table 2
Mean hit rates, false alarm rates and d’ values per trial at each age
Trial
Hit FA d' 
"know" 2 yrs 0.39 0.36 0.08
(more evidence) 3 yrs 0.69 0.36 0.85
4 yrs 0.95 0.26 2.29
2 yrs 0.48 0.40 0.20
"think" 3 yrs 0.45 0.31 0.37
(less evidence) 4 yrs 0.55 0.08 1.53
It was also of interest to examine the frequency distribution of scores for 
each game (see Figure 2) and to test whether this distribution differed from 
chance at each age.
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Success on 1 trial
Success on both trials
Figure 2
In order to test whether there was any particular game that presented 
difficulties to children a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with 
age (2 ½, 3 ½, 4 ½) as the between-subject factor and game (cards, books, bags, 
light bulb, gifts) as the within-subject factor (See Table 3 for mean scores at each 
game). The Huynh-Feldt test6 revealed that the effect of game was significant, F 
(3.8, 172.6) = 2.72, p = 0.03. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the only 
significant difference was between the mean score in the cards game (M= 1.04) 
and the mean score in the gift game (M= 1.31), p= 0.04. 
Table 3
Mean scores per game (age collapsed)
N Mean SD
Cards 48 1.04 0.58
Boxes 48 1.21 0.58
Bags 48 1.15 0.62
Lbulb 48 1.06 0.60
Gifts 48 1.31 0.62
6 The Huyn-Feldt test is more conservative but it corrected for the violation of the sphericity 
assumption present in the analysis.
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Finally, Chi-square tests were conducted to compare the frequency of 
scores (0, 1 and 2) for each game and at each age. In a random distribution, the 
scores of 0 and 2 should occur 25 of the time and the score should occur 50 r The 
score of 1 was expected to occur twice more asfrequently because there were two 
possible ways through which children could receive this score: by succeeding in 
the “more evidence” trial or by succeeding in the “less evidence” trial. The results 
of the Chi-square analyses suggest that at age 2, children are performing 
randomly on all five games (all ps > 0.05). At age 3, CChi-square values did not 
differ from chance for any game, with the exception of the light bulb game, χ2 (2, 
N= 16) = 12.38, p = 0.002. At age 4, all Chi-squares differed significantly from 




The main goal of Study 1 was to test whether children could show a 
rudimentary understanding of the conceptual distinction between think and know
before age 4. Children’s performance at age 4 was significantly above chance for 
the “more evidence” trials but, contrary to my predictions, their performance at 
ages 2 and 3 were not different from chance for both types of trial. Having a task 
during which children were asked about their own mental states, rather than being 
asked about the mental states of a third person (e.g., a puppet) as was done in 
prior research, did not help to improve children’s performance. 
The fact that 2- and 3-year-olds did not perform above chance in this task 
does not necessarily indicate a complete absence of an understanding of “think” 
and “know.” In three of the five games, children were presented with containers 
(i.e., boxes, bags, gifts) with an object inside. During these games, several 
participants attempted to look inside the containers in the “less evidence” trials, 
that is, when they could not see what was inside. Although their behavior seemed 
to indicate that they were not sure about what was inside the containers, their 
verbal response was “I know there is a … inside.” Therefore, there is still the 
possibility that there is a rudimentary or implicit understanding of the concepts 
underlying these mental state words that is not being grasped by the tasks used in 
current research. 
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Several recent studies have produced findings that point to the existence of 
implicit knowledge that is not revealed by children’s verbal responses. Goldin-
Meadow, Alibali and Church (1993), for example, propose a model to explain 
discrepancies between children’s verbal responses and their gestures, suggesting 
that such mismatches signal a state of transitional knowledge during which the 
child is “ready to learn.” 
In the realm of false-belief understanding, Perner and Clements have been 
investigating discrepancies between looking behavior and verbal responses of 
children in false-belief tasks (Clements & Perner, 1994; Perner and Clements, 
1998; Clements, Rustin & McCallum, 2000). They argue that although 3-year-
olds’ verbal responses suggest they have not yet developed an understanding of 
false-belief, their looking behavior suggests the existence of implicit knowledge. 
In their first study, Clements and Perner (1994) had participants (ages
ranging from 2;5 to 4;6) listen to one story that had two versions: a false belief 
and a true belief (control). In the false belief version, Sam the Mouse put some 
cheese into a box (location A) but when he was asleep, his friend moved the 
cheese to another box (location B). In the true belief version, Sam actually sees 
his friend moving the cheese before he goes to sleep. The vast majority of 
children looked at location A in the false belief version when asked where Sam 
would look for the cheese, even though almost half of them gave the wrong verbal 
response: that Sam would look for the cheese in location B. One could argue that 
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children looked at A in the false condition because they were merely retracing 
with their eyes the sequence of story events. Clement and Perner (1994) argue, 
however, that if this were true, then children should look at A in both true and 
false-belief conditions. As predicted by them, children looked at A in the false-
belief condition but looked at B in the true-belief condition, which was interpreted 
as a sign that they expected Sam to look for his cheese in location A. Moreover, 
their looking behavior is interpreted by these researchers as a sign of an implicit 
understanding of false belief. 
In a more recent study, Clements et al. (2000) focused on how they could 
promote the transition from an implicit understanding of false belief to an explicit 
understanding through training. Children were assigned to three different 
conditions: a practice condition in which children were presented with different 
examples of false belief; an explanation condition in which they were also given 
an explanation about the stories and a third, control, condition in which the two 
stories being presented were not related to false belief. Their results suggest that 
providing children with an explanation leads to improvement; however, training 
was only helpful when children displayed implicit understanding of false belief in 
a pre-test measure (i.e., their looking behavior indicated the correct response 
although the verbal response was incorrect).
The idea of transitional knowledge seems to fit well with the story of how 
children acquire mental state concepts. For many years, researchers have only 
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worked with the notion of competence, “the logical knowledge needed to solve a 
task” (Sophian, 1997, p.281) which has indeed promoted important advances in 
developmental research. However, as Sophian (1997) claims, competence 
approaches to cognitive development are also limited in a number of ways. For 
example, Sophian argues that competence models emphasize successful 
performance and disregard the fact that children may “have knowledge that is not 
manifested in their performance” (p.294). Importantly, they fail to address the 
questions that, as Siegler (1997) suggests, developmentalists should be asking 
themselves all the time: how does developmental change take place? What are the 
mechanisms of change? How can we explain the variability we find in children’s 
thinking? 
Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) model of representational redescription also 
embraces this idea of a transition from implicit to explicit knowledge. In her own 
words, “representational redescription is a process by which implicit information 
in the mind subsequently becomes explicit knowledge to the mind, first within a 
domain and then sometimes across domains” (p.18). In the case of language 
acquisition, for example, Karmiloff-Smith proposes that children initially have 
linguistic representations that are used for “comprehending and producing their 
native tongue,” which could be translated into implicit knowledge that gradually 
becomes explicit. 
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The question to be raised then is whether we could apply this notion of 
transitional knowledge or implicit versus explicit knowledge to the acquisition of 
mental state concepts. One could raise the possibility that the development of an 
understanding of “mental states” is a gradual process, mediated by several 
attempts on the part of young children to understand all the nuances of a concept 
of mental states. At one point, children are able to contrast their own mental states 
with those of other people. At a later point, they may be able to understand the 
distinction between know and think as indicating two different degrees of 
certainty. However, it could also be that children have some transitional or 
implicit knowledge about mental states early on and the tasks we have developed 
so far are not good measures of such knowledge. At this point in time, we still 
have no test of whether children possess an implicit understanding of mental 
states before the age of 4. Such a test is needed if we want to understand more 
about the developmental process through which children acquire an understanding 
of mental states.
Another problem one could raise concerning studies investigating the 
acquisition of mental states is that they often include only children who are 3 or 
older. It is important to remember, however, that children start producing words 
like think and know earlier, right after the second birthday (Barstch & Wellman, 
1995; Shatz et al., 1983). One problem with testing young children is that we still 
have not developed good methods to test 2-year-olds. 
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As every researcher who has attempted to conduct research with younger 
children probably knows, there are several obstacles: their attention span tends to 
be short and it is hard to keep them focused on one task for a period of time; there 
is great variability in vocabulary and other linguistic skills; and finally, they may 
have little experience with social scenarios such as the one presented to them in 
an experiment, in which an adult is testing them or asking them to perform a 
certain task. Two-year-old children may be very shy at first, taking a long time to 
“warm-up” or, at times, refusing to participate at all. Because of these limitations, 
tasks have to be designed so that they are not too demanding linguistically (e.g., 
requesting behavioral responses, such as pointing to objects, rather than 
requesting a verbal response).
This is where our greatest challenge lies: creating experiments that are 
appropriate for children as young as 2 and that are, at the same time, good tests of 
their understanding early in development. We have two choices: we can either 
choose not to run studies with 2-year-olds and just assume that they have no 
knowledge whatsoever of what mental state words refer to or we can insist, persist 
and keep thinking about ways to improve our methods so they can become better 
measures of what goes on in the mind of these 2-year-old children. 
In sum, if one wants to pursue the question of how an understanding of 
mental states develops, more attention should be devoted to what happens early in 
development, that is, at around age 2 which, in turn, could reveal changes that will
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gradually lead children to a more sophisticated understanding. Having evidence 
for the existence of implicit knowledge about mental states may also enlighten us 
about what exactly is changing or transforming in children’s thinking about 
mental states. 
One possible future direction is to examine children’s looking behavior 
(e.g., the number of attempts at looking inside the box or bag) in contrast to their 
verbal responses. As previous research suggests, this strategy may be a helpful 
resource in identifying an implicit understanding of these mental state terms 
(Clements & Perner, 1994; Perner and Clements, 1997; Clements, Rustin & 
McCallum, 2000).
Consistent with previous findings (Bassano, 1985; Johnson & Wellman, 
1980; Moore et al., 1989), it is only at the age of 4 that children display a 
complete understanding of the verb know. 4-year-olds are good at matching know
with situations in which they have certainty as is evidenced by their almost ceiling 
performance in the “more evidence” trials (M= 4.75) but they still have 
difficulties differentiating think from know when there is ambiguous information 
or less certainty about the identity of the target object. The performance of 4-year-
olds in the “less evidence” trials (when they have less evidence about the target 
object) is not significantly above chance. One possible interpretation for 
children’s poor performance in the “less evidence” trials is that children are 
overapplying know to situations when they do not have enough evidence. On the 
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other hand, it was also possible that children are overapplying think to situations 
for which they do have enough evidence. The false alarm rates among the 4-year-
olds in the “more evidence” trials, that is, responding with “know” when they 
should be responding with “think,” are higher (M= 0.26) than their false alarm 
rates in the “less evidence” trials, that is, responding with “think” when they 
should be responding with “know” (M=0.08) which suggests that when children 
make errors, they are more likely to overapply know to “less evidence” contexts 
than to overapply think to “more evidence” contexts. 
One interesting future direction will be to examine how 5-year-olds 
perform in this task and test whether they are less likely to respond with know in 
contexts during which uncertainty is present. Previous studies (O’Neill, Astington 
& Flavell, 1992; O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Pillow, 1989; Woolley & Bruell, 1996) 
have shown that it is in the period between 3 and 5 years of age, that children 
come to identify possible sources of knowledge. Preschool children seem to 
recognize that seeing and feeling something or being told about it leads to a state 
of knowledge (O’Neill, Astington & Flavell, 1992; O’Neill & Gopnik, 199; 
Pillow, 1989). The only exception is with regard to inferences. It is only at the age 
of 6 that children can identify inference as one possible source of knowledge 
(O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Pillow, Hill, Boyxe & Stein, 2000; Sodian and 
Wimmer, 1987; Woolley & Bruell, 1996). 
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The results of Study 1 in combination with prior research suggest that the 
age of 4 may be an important period in the development of an understanding of 
mental states, specifically, KNOW. At the age of 4, children succeed in the task of 
applying the word know to contexts in which sufficient evidence is provided. 
Children are gradually discovering what events and circumstances lead to 
knowledge. Moreover, they are learning which of these events provides sufficient 
evidence for them to claim that they know something, that they are certain about 
it. The question, once more, is why preschool children still encounter difficulties 
with “think.” Bassano (1985) argues that think is initially encoded as having the 
properties of certainty and at the ages of 4 and 5, children are gradually 
differentiating think from know. As discussed above, Bassano presented children 
with four dolls, two of which had their eyes open and two of which were 
blindfolded. When asked about which doll had uttered the statement “I think I 
have a fish,” participants tended to include the doll that had her eyes open (and 
had a fish) as one of their options.  
One possible interpretation is that an understanding of think requires an 
additional task from young children. Not only do children have to identify the 
type of evidence leading to the belief but they also have to make a decision about 
whether this type of evidence suffices for them to claim certainty. For example, 
when presented with a box that contains an object (that cannot be seen) and 
hearing music coming from inside, children have to make two realizations: (1) 
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this music could be played by a telephone and (2) I have not seen what is inside 
so I do not know if the box contains a telephone or another object (e.g., a toy 
piano). In other words, one has to contemplate the possible sources of a belief and 
decide whether there is enough evidence confirming the belief.
Another factor may have also contributed to the difference found between 
the “more evidence” and the “less evidence” trials. The literature on the 
development of achievement motivation suggests that preschoolers tend to rate 
their own abilities more positively than is warranted and that this “positivity bias” 
declines with age (Schuster, Ruble & Weinert, 1998; Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989). 
Although achievement motivation studies did not include children younger 
than 5, these findings could have implications for Study 1. If young children are
prone to overestimate their knowledge, then we might expect them to be inclined 
to say that they know .the contents of a container even when they have insufficient 
information. Therefore, another possible explanation for the results is that 4-year-
olds understand the difference in meaning between think and know but they 
respond with know rather than think because they are overly optimistic about their 
abilities to know the contents of a container even without sufficient information..
Finally, it remains unclear whether the poor performance of 4-year-olds in 
the “less evidence” trials is the result of a semantic issue, that is, a difficulty in 
understanding the meaning of the word think (or a difficulty in contrasting the 
words think and know) or whether it reflects a cognitive issue, for example, an 
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inability to identify events that lead to uncertainty or a lack of an understanding of 
uncertainty. As Acredolo and O’Connor (1991) point out, the methods currently 
utilized in cognitive development research are rarely designed to reveal when 
children are uncertain about the answers they provide. Investigations including 
implicit evidence (e.g., measures of looking behavior as well as verbal responses) 
or studies including a measure of how certain children are about their responses 
(e.g., Woolley & Van Reet, 2004) may contribute to the field by identifying when 
exactly children start displaying uncertainty and when they achieve an 
understanding of uncertainty and the situations that lead to it.
In summary, the results of Study 1 suggest that a complete conceptual 
distinction between know and think does not emerge before age 4. However, these 
results should not be interpreted as evidence that there is no implicit 
understanding of mental states before age 4. Future research should use different 
measures, for example, looking behavior, in an attempt to reveal a possible 
implicit and transitional understanding of these mental state terms. Finally, an 
interesting future direction for this study would be to conduct a comparison with 
speakers of languages other than English, for example, speakers of Portuguese. As 
discussed in the introduction, Portuguese makes fine-grained distinctions between 
different senses of know and think and these cross-linguistic differences could 
potentially affect children’s developing understanding of these two terms. An 
important question (and one that remains unanswered) is whether the 
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developmental pattern towards an understanding of think and know observed in 
Study 1 is universal or whether it varies across languages.
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IV. Study 2
The general purpose of the second study was to test whether there are 
differences between English-speaking U.S. and Brazilian children in their 
understanding of particular senses of think and know. More specifically, the goal 
of Study 2 was to address the question of whether there are differences across 
languages in children’s understanding of the two different senses of think (i.e., 
pensar and achar) and  the two different senses of know (i.e., saber and conhecer) 
that are explicitly marked in Portuguese.
Little work concerning the semantic distinctions between saber and 
conhecer and between achar and pensar has been conducted. Interestingly, other 
Romance languages also make similar distinctions. For example, Spanish has the 
equivalent terms saber and conocer and a similar fine-grained distinction between 
the two think verbs: creer and pensar. French has the two terms savoir and 
connaitre mapping onto these senses of know and penser and croire mapping onto 
the two senses of think. There is no work yet, however, investigating these 
semantic distinctions in any of these Romance languages and whether these cross-
linguistic differences have any effect on the development of an understanding of 
mental states. An investigation of possible differences between English and 
Portuguese in how these two languages express mental states could prove to be 
very informative, for example, of the role of semantics in children’s 
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understanding of mental state concepts. Moreover, it helps to fill a gap in the 
Romance literature concerning these semantic distinctions. 
Method
Participants
Pilot data suggested that the task in which children were asked to make 
these finer grained distinctions of think and know was too difficult for 2- and 3-
year-old children. One possibility is that the task required some metalinguistic 
abilities that are not present at those ages. Consequently, participants for the 
second study were children at 4-, 5-, and 6- years of age. 
Ninety-six Brazilian Portuguese-speaking and ninety-six English-speaking 
children in the U.S. participated in this study with equal numbers of children 
participating at each of the three different age groups (16 boys and 16 girls in 
each age group). Children in the U.S. were recruited using the database at the 
Children’s Research Lab. As for Study 1, parents of children of the appropriate 
age for the study were contacted by letter and, several days after they received the 
letter, were contacted by phone and asked whether they would be interested in 
having their child participate in the study. Brazilian children attended three 
schools in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The principal investigator, who is a native 
speaker of Brazilian Portuguese, contacted the three different schools and met 
with the directors and coordinators to explain the details of the study. In each of 
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the three schools, the experimenter was introduced to the teachers and their 
students by the director (in one case) or by the pre-school coordinator (in the two 
other schools). The teachers distributed a copy of the consent form; only the 
children who brought the consent form signed by their parents were allowed to 
participate. 
As in Study 1, the consent form used both at the Children’s Research Lab 
and at the Brazilian schools included an SES questionnaire. Only one parent in the 
U.S. group and three parents in the Brazilian group did not provide answers for 
the questionnaire. An independent t-test comparing the mean scores for the SES 
questionnaire of the Brazilian and U.S. groups revealed no significant difference 
between the two groups (t(186) = 1.154, p = .122). Both Brazilian and U.S. 
participants were classified as coming from upper-class families according to their 
mean scores (21.93 for the U.S. sample and 22.8 for the Brazilian sample).
Materials and Procedure
PPVT (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Children’s vocabularies were 
measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test- PPVT (Dunn & Dunn, 1997). 
The PPVT is a measure of receptive vocabulary in which children are shown a 
series of plates with a set of four pictures each. The experimenter shows a plate 
then says a word and asks the child to point to the picture of that word. The 
duration of the test generally is between 10 and 15 minutes. U.S. children were 
tested with the English version of this test. The Hispanic-American version of this 
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test, Test de Vocabulario en Imágenes Peabody – TVIP, has been translated and 
adapted to Brazilian Portuguese by Capovilla and colleagues (1997a, 1997b) and 
this standardized version provided us with the opportunity to use the same 
vocabulary measure with the two language groups. 
Task. Children were presented with videotaped scenarios during which the two 
senses of know (i.e., “knowing a person” and “knowing a fact”) and the two 
senses of think (“thinking about something” and “having a lesser degree of 
certainty”) were used (see Appendix C for an example of a complete script). 
English and Brazilian-Portuguese versions of the videotape were created using the 
same bilingual actors. Participants were told about two boys, Paul and Jonas, who 
would be appearing on the television. The experimenter told them that one of 
them, Jonas, came from a place far away from here and although he could speak 
English (Portuguese) very well, he sometimes got “mixed up” and used some 
funny words in his own language, Nemesian. The experimenter then told 
participants that he/she needed their help to try to figure out what Jonas was really 
trying to say when he used these “funny words.”
In order to get participants familiarized with the test question, the session 
began with a warm-up scenario. Children watched the following scene: Paul is 
jumping up and down. Jonas comes into the room and says “Paul, you’re doofing. 
That looks like fun. I want to doof too.” Jonas then begins to jump. After 
watching this scene twice and after answering a comprehension question, children 
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were told: “Jonas is using this funny word doofing. What is he really trying to say 
in English?” If a child could not provide an answer or provided an answer that 
was completely out of context such as “He’s trying to say cooking,” the 
experimenter said “That’s good” and presented the child with a forced-choice 
question: “But when he says ‘Paul, you’re doofing,’ is he trying to say jumping  or 
is he trying to say walking?” If a child had not provided a correct answer for the 
forced-choice question, he/she would have been excluded from analyses. All 
children gave an appropriate response, at least to the forced-choice question, and 
therefore, no child had to be excluded for this reason.
Following the warm-up task, children were presented with two scenes 
during which the two senses of think were used and two scenes during which the 
two senses of know were used. The set-up was the same as the one used in the 
warm-up task. Jonas said a sentence that included a nonsense word that mapped 
onto one of the senses of think or one of the senses of know. Children were then 
told: “Jonas used this funny word …… What is he really trying to say in 
English?” For example, in one of the scenes, Jonas comes into the room and sees 
Paul playing with a boy. He looks at Paul and says: “Paul, I don’t zop this boy. 
Who is he?” And Paul replies: “He’s my cousin, Mark. And we’re playing 
together.” The experimenter then asks the child: “When Paul says ‘I don’t zop this 
boy, what is he really trying to say in English?”
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For each of the four different test trials, children were encouraged to 
provide a spontaneous answer. If they failed to do so, a forced-choice question 
was given. For example, the child would hear: “When Jonas is saying ‘I don’t zop
this boy,’ is he trying to say ‘he doesn’t like this boy’ or is he trying to say ‘he 
doesn’t know this boy’?” The order of the target words in the forced-choice 
questions was counterbalanced as was the order of the two different senses of 
each word and whether the “know” or the “think” scenarios came first. 
After the two “think” scenes and after the two “know” scenes, children 
were presented with a question about the meaning of the “funny words” used in 
the previous two stories. For instance, after hearing a story during which the novel 
word “zop” was used to refer to “knowing a person” and another story during 
which the word “mek” was used to refer to “knowing a fact,” the experimenter 
said: “In this last story, Jonas used the funny word mek; in the story before this 
one, he used the funny word zop. Do these two words, zop and mek, mean 
different things? If so, what is the difference?” 
It was expected that this question would present some difficulties even to 
the 6-year-olds because it required more advanced metalinguistic abilities than the 
primary task. Children were being asked to think not only about the meanings of 
two words, but also to compare them and provide a justification for why the 
words were different in meaning. Nonetheless, even if children could not provide 
a justification for why they had a same or different meaning, it would be 
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informative to examine whether children could recognize a difference between the 
two novel words in the “think” scenes and between the two words in the “know” 
scenes.
Half of the Brazilian participants and half of the U.S. participants were 
assigned to a 2-word-condition that was created to simulate the reality faced by 
Brazilian children, that is, having two different words for the two different senses 
of each target word. For example, children heard the word zop as referring to 
“knowing someone” and the word mek as referring to “knowing a fact.” The other 
half of the participants were assigned to a 1-word-condition designed to simulate 
the reality faced by U.S. children, in other words, having a single word that maps 
onto the two different senses of the target word. For instance, children heard the 
word zop both in the “knowing a person” and in the “knowing a fact” scenarios.
Results
There were two predictions for Study 2. Firstly, I hypothesized that having 
the distinctions marked in their language would help Brazilian children in the 
process of acquiring the conceptual understanding of the two senses of think and 
the two senses of know. As a result, Brazilian children would perform better in the 
task than the U.S. children. Secondly, I predicted that U.S. children would have 
some ability to understand the subtle differences between the two senses of think
and the two senses of know that are marked in Brazilian Portuguese.
77
Coding was conducted in the following manner: children received a 
separate score (0 to 2) for the two “think” scenarios and another score (0 to 2) for 
the two “know” scenarios. In other words, if children were able to provide think
responses (“pensar” and “achar” in the case of Brazilian children) spontaneously 
in the two “think” scenarios and know responses (“saber” and “conhecer”) in the 
two “know” scenarios, they received a score of 4 (1 point for each question 
answered appropriately). Answers to the forced-choice question were not included 
in the initial analysis; children who failed to provide a valid response prior to the 
forced-choice question were given a 0 for that question.7
Responses to the question concerning a possible difference in meaning 
between the two novel words were coded in the following manner: If children 
said “yes, they are different,” they received a score of 1. If they said “they are the 
same,” they received a score of 0. As this question is asked twice (once after the 
“think” scenes and secondly, after the “know” scenes), the scores ranged from 0 
to 2. 
The design of Study 2 was a 3 (age: 4, 5 and 6) x 2 (language: Portuguese, 
English) x 2 (condition: one word, two words) between-subjects design. A series 
of preliminary analyses were conducted  to test for influences of gender  and 
7The forced choice responses were included in an additional analysis, one for which the criterion 
for a correct response was more lenient Results from the analyses including the forced-choice 
answers yielded similar results to the analyses not including them. I decided, however, to maintain 
a more strict criterion and report only the results  on children’s spontaneous answers
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counterbalancing. An ANCOVA was conducted with age, condition, language 
and gender as between-subjects factors and PPVT scores entered as a covariate. 
There was no main effect of gender, F (1, 167) = 1.121, p= 0.291, nor did it 
interact significantly with any other variable. Another ANCOVA was conducted 
with age, condition, language and order of scenes (“think” or “know” first) as 
between-subject factors and no main effect of order of scenes was found, F (1, 
167)= 0.791, p=.375 nor any interactions. Lastly, an ANCOVA was conducted 
with order of trials (e.g., “zop” or “mek” first) added as a between-subject factor 
and again, no main effect was found, F (1, 167) = 0.989, p= 0.796 nor any 
significant interactions. Therefore, subsequent analyses are collapsed across 
gender and across orders of scenes and trials.
To test the primary prediction, that performance would differ across 
language samples, a three-way ANCOVA was conducted with age, language and 
condition as between-subject factors and PPVT scores as a covariate. PPVT 
scores were significantly related to children’s performance in the task, F (1, 179) 
= 15.15, p = .000. There was no main effect of language, F (1, 179) = .278, p > 
.05, however, a significant main effect of age was found, F (2, 279) = 33.06, p = 
.000 as well as  a significant age x condition interaction, F (2, 179) = 3.024, p = 
0.05. Pairwise comparisons revealed that at age 5, there was a significant 
difference between the mean score in the 1-word-condition (M= 1.65) and the 
mean score in the 2-word-condition (M=2.47) but not at ages 4 and 6 (see Figure 
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3). There was a trend towards a language x age interaction, F (2, 179) = 2.538, p = 
.082. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the difference in mean scores between 
the two language groups was not significant at any of the three ages. However, 
this trend likely arises because Brazilians have a slightly (but not significantly) 
lower mean score than U.S. children at ages 4 and 6 and a slightly (but not 
significantly) higher score at age 5 (see Figure 3).
Children's Performance in the 1-word-










A 2 (language) x 3 (age) x 2 (condition) x 2 (type of trial) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to examine whether there were differences in 
children’s performance between the “think” trials and the “know” trials. There 
was a main effect of age, F (2, 179) = 33.06, p= .000 but no main effect of 
language, F (1,179)= 0.28, p=0.60 nor type of trial, F (1, 179) = 0.042, p=0.84. A 
significant interaction between the type of trial (“think” versus “know”) and 
language was found, F (1, 179) = 10.43, p= .001 (see Figure 4). Pairwise 
comparsions indicated that there was a significant difference in performance 
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between the two language groups for the “know” trials (M= .96 for U.S. children 
and M=.74 for Brazilian children, p= .027) but not for the “think” trials (p=.22).
Performance of Brazilian and U.S. children 











A trial (“think”, “know”) x language x condition interaction was also 
found, F (1, 179) = 4.25, p= .041. Pairwise comparisons revealed that for the 
“know” trials, in the one word condition, there was a significant difference 
between U.S. and Brazilian children. The mean score (out of 2) for the U.S. 
sample was 0.91 compared to 0.62 in the Brazilian sample, p= .003. However, 
U.S. children were not favored in all analyses. There was a trend towards a trial x 
language x age interaction, F (2, 179) = 2.67, p= .072 and pairwise comparisons 
indicated that at age 5, for the “think” trials, Brazilian children had a higher mean 
score (M=1.46) than U.S. children (M=.90). Additional analyses revealed that at 
age 6, there is also a significant difference between language groups (p= .043) for 
the “know” trials, with U.S. children having an advantage (M=1.4 compared to 
M=1.1 for Brazilians). 
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Another 3 (age: 4, 5, 6) x 2 (condition: 1-word, 2-word) x 2 (language: BR 
Portuguese, English) ANCOVA was conducted to examine children’s responses 
to the question concerning a possible difference in meaning between the two 
senses of think and the two senses of know. For the purpose of clarity, it will be 
called the metalinguistic question. Once again, PPVT scores were entered as a 
covariate but they did not correlate significantly with children’s responses to the 
metalinguistic question, F (1, 179) = .003, p =.957. A main effect of language was 
found, F (1, 179)= 4.02, p= .046 as well as an age x language interaction, F (2, 
179)= 8.87, p =.000. Pairwise comparisons revealed that at all three ages, there 
was a significant difference between the English and the BR Portuguese groups 
(ps= .03, .03, .001 for ages 4, 5 and 6 respectively). At age 4, U.S. children have 
higher scores (M=1.34) compared to the Brazilian children (M= .94) and at ages 5 
and 6, Brazilians perform better: M= 1.41 compared to 1.00 for U.S. children at 
age 5 and 1.69 compared to 1.03 at age 6 (see Figure 5).  
Performance on Metalinguistic Question 












The main prediction for Study 2 was that Brazilian children should have 
an advantage in the task of identifying the two senses of know and think because 
they are explicitly marked in Portuguese but not in English. Although the results 
of this study do not point to an overall advantage for Brazilian children, they 
reveal an interesting developmental pattern as well as some interesting similarities 
and differences between BR Portuguese and English speakers.
Firstly, the results suggest that some interesting changes are taking place 
at age 5. At this age, children from both language groups perform better in the 
novel word task in the 2-word condition than in the 1 word-condition; this pattern 
is not observed at ages 4 and 6 (see Figure 3 in the previous section). One 
interpretation of these findings is that age 5 represents a transitional point in the 
development of an understanding of these mental state words. It is possible that 5-
year-olds are performing better in the 2-word condition because having a distinct 
external sign (i.e., a different novel word) mapped onto each one of these four 
senses is helpful at this age. Perhaps, at 6, children from both language groups 
already have their own “internal” concepts of the senses of think and know that 
correspond to saber and conhecer as well as pensar and achar, and having two 
words or one word no longer confers an advantage. 
83
This interpretation is consistent with some of Vygotsky’s (1978) ideas. 
According to him, external signs may be helpful at particular points in the 
developmental process but these signs subsequently become “internalized” and at 
that point are no longer needed. 
The developmental changes in sign operations are akin to those that occur 
in language. Aspects of external or communicative speech as well as 
egocentric speech turn “inward” to become the basis of inner speech. 
(1978, p.57)
Vygotsky supports his claim by providing evidence from memory 
experiments conducted in his laboratory. Whereas school-age children benefited 
from the availability of external memory aids, adults were successful regardless of 
whether external memory aids were available. Vygotsky argued that children 
needed external signs but adults no longer needed the external aids because they 
had been “internalized.” Vygotsky also claimed that this process of internalization 
of external signs characterizes development more broadly and is responsible for 
influences of language on thought: words initially serve as external aids to 
thought but subsequently guide thought as “internal speech.” This is consistent 
with the findings from Study 2. Five-year-olds who participated in the 2-word-
condition, that is, those who heard two novel words used in the two “think” trials 
and two novel words used in the “know” trials, had higher scores than those who 
participated in the 1-word-condition (i.e., having one novel word used in the two 
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“think” trials and one novel word used in two “know” trials). At the age of 6, 
however, no significant differences were found between the scores of participants 
in the 1-word-condition and those of participants in the 2-word-condition. And 
this was true for both language groups as evidenced by the absence of a language 
x condition interaction.
Interestingly, being in the 2-word condition does not make children more 
likely to see possible differences between the two senses of each target word; 
there is no main effect of condition on their performance in the metalinguistic task 
(and condition did not interact significantly with language or age on that task). 
Therefore, having two words does not help children to recognize, on a conscious 
level, that there are differences in meaning associated with the concepts of 
“saber” and “conhecer” and of “pensar” and “achar.” However, there is a 
developmental shift in children’s performance in the metalinguistic task that may 
help to explain this finding. At age 4, U.S. children have higher scores than 
Brazilian children, but at ages 5 and 6, Brazilian children have higher scores. 
Perhaps being in the 2-word condition does not improve children’s performance 
in the metalinguistic task but speaking a language that highlights these differences 
does improve performance at a later point in the process. One possible 
interpretation of this pattern of results is that having the distinctions marked in the 
language initially makes it more difficult for children to reflect on the language 
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forms but ultimately increases children’s awareness of the distinctions at a 
metalinguistic level.
Secondly, although there is not a significant difference between language 
groups concerning their performance on the novel word task (when age groups are 
combined), Brazilian children are performing significantly better than U.S. 
children on the “think” trials at age 5.
This pattern of results is unexpected because the prediction was that 
Brazilians would have an advantage on both types of trials. One possibility is that 
the development of an understanding of pensar and achar (i.e., think) comes 
earlier for Brazilian speakers than an understanding of saber and conhecer (i.e., 
“know”). It seems unlikely, however, that 5- and 6-year-olds in Brazil would not 
have an understanding of the uses of saber and conhecer. 
One could argue that there was something specific about the “know” trials 
that was posing difficulties for Brazilian children.  Perhaps the question “Do you 
mek (or zop) that elephants say hello by touching their trunks?” was too long and 
that increased the level of children’s distraction from the task. That also seems 
unlikely for two reasons: the scene was played at least twice and the question was 
repeated at least once. If the child did show any sign of distraction or confusion, 
the experimenter rephrased the sentence or played the scene as many times as 
necessary; secondly, if there was something specific about this particular trial, 
U.S. children would also find difficulties with it because the complexity of the 
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sentence was comparable across English and Brazilian Portuguese but that was 
not the case.
Another possibility is that there is something more elaborate or 
complicated in the semantic scope of the two know verbs: saber and conhecer
than the two think verbs, pensar and achar. It is true that they are not exclusively 
used in the contexts of “knowing a fact” and “knowing a person.” Moreover, both 
sometimes can be used in the same sentence frame despite conveying different 
senses. For example, one can say in Portuguese, “Eu conheço essa música” (“I 
know this song”) as referring to a recognition that “I have heard this song before.” 
One can also say “Eu sei essa música” (same sentence frame) but the sense is now 
slightly different: knowing the lyrics or knowing how to sing it. On the other 
hand, there are certain contexts in which only one choice is appropriate. For 
instance, one can never say in Portuguese “Eu sei a Melissa” to express “having 
acquaintance with Melissa”; the appropriate word choice would always be “Eu 
conheço a Melissa.” Conversely, one can never say “Eu conheço Matemática” as 
referring to “having the knowledge of mathematical concepts”; the correct choice 
would be “Eu sei Matemática.” 
Therefore, the task Brazilian children are faced with when trying to 
identify the different senses and uses of know is more complicated than one would 
expect at first. Not only do they have to identify which word goes with each sense 
of know but they also have to discover that under certain circumstances, both 
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verbs can be used in the same sentence frame (and nonetheless can produce two 
different meanings) whereas under other circumstances, only one verb and only 
one meaning are allowed.
The case of think is slightly different. Pensar and achar can be used 
interchangeably, sometimes producing the same meaning. For example, “Eu 
penso que essa idéia é boa” or “Eu acho que essa idéia é boa”  can both be used to 
express “I think this is a good idea.” The difference is that the first option is 
considered more formal and rarely found in colloquial speech, especially in 
speech directed to children. Therefore, achar and pensar can be used to express 
“having an opinion” or to indicate a lesser degree of certainty but “achar” is much 
more frequently chosen to express these senses of think than pensar. 
On the other hand, when one wants to refer to the process of thinking as in 
“What are you thinking right now?” pensar is the only correct word choice – “O 
que você está pensando agora?” It is possible that the boundaries between these 
different senses of “think” are more clearly defined at least in speech directed to 
children than the boundaries between the different senses of know. Achar
generally is used to indicate a lesser degree of certainty or to indicate an opinion 
and pensar is used to refer to the process of thinking (Ferreira, 1986; Fernandez, 
1965; Ganho & McGovern, 2004; Prista, 1966).
If Brazilian children’s lower scores in the “know” trials are a result of a 
more complicated semantic domain, one would expect that their errors would 
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convey a confusion between the appropriate uses of saber and conhecer. A closer 
look at children’s responses do not reveal such errors, however. The type of errors 
made were one of two kinds: (a) children could not provide an answer to the 
question; (b) they provided a word that sounded like the novel word but that was 
unrelated to the intended meaning (e.g., one U.S. child said Jonas was trying to 
say “make” in the sentence containing the novel word “mek”). The first type of 
error was more frequent than the second type.
Not one single child, however, used saber when conhecer should have 
been used or vice-versa. The only exception perhaps was in the scenario in which 
Jonas says “I don’t zop this boy. Who is he?” A few Brazilian children said he 
was trying to say “Eu não sei quem ele é” (I don’t know who he is) instead of “Eu 
não conheço esse menino” (I don’t know this boy). But in this case, children were 
using saber appropriately. It is a correct and acceptable sentence in Portuguese 
conveying a similar but distinct meaning. Future research should investigate 
whether there is a different time frame for the development of an understanding of 
saber and conhecer among Portuguese speaking children and if so, the underlying 
reasons for such a difference.
As can be seen, the results of Study 2 do not point to an overall effect of 
language on children’s performance in the task of identifying different senses of 
think and know. It may be that performance in the novel word task did not tend to 
differ between languages because the two senses of think and know that were 
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tested are represented conceptually by U.S. children even if they are not marked 
in the language. In other words, U.S. children display an understanding of the 
subtle distinctions between saber and conhecer and between pensar and achar in 
spite of not having linguistic labels for them. On the other hand, having this 
distinction marked in Portuguese seems to help 5- and 6-year-old Brazilian
children in being consciously aware of the differences between saber and 
conhecer and achar and pensar. Although the prediction that Brazilian children 
would perform better overall in the novel word task was not supported, these 
results point to some interesting effects of language.
Although the findings from Study 2 point to interesting similarities and 
differences between speakers of Brazilian Portuguese and speakers of English in 
their developing understanding of think and know, it remains unclear whether 
participants in Study 2 were being asked to make distinctions between different 
meanings of think and know or between different senses of these words. 
According to Vygotsky (1962),
Meaning is only one of the zones of sense, the most stable and precise 
zone. A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears; in 
different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout 
the changes of sense. The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a 
stone in the edifice of sense, no more than a potentiality that finds 
diversified realization in speech. (p.146)
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The difference between meaning and sense is subtle. Vygotsky argues that 
a given word entails different senses when it is used in different contexts and 
the meaning of the word is merely one of the most stable and precise “zones” 
of sense; one that can probably be used across different contexts.
Interestingly, U.S. children were able to make a distinction between saber and 
conhecer and between pensar and achar in spite of English not having
linguistic labels for them. One could raise the possibility that making a 
distinction between think and know involves differentiating between two 
meanings but the differences between saber and conhecer and pensar and 
achar are actually differences between different senses of think and know. 
Research on children’s understanding of mental state terms has gained 
increasing attention in recent years, especially because of the significant 
contribution it may provide to the current knowledge on theory of mind 
development. More cross-linguistic work is needed, however, to test the 
universality in the development of such an understanding and to test possible 
effects of language on this cognitive domain. Study 2 contributes to the field by 
providing the first attempt at investigating closely differences between English-
and Portuguese-speaking children and how these differences may affect children’s 
understanding of specific mental state terms. 
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IV. General Discussion
Children’s acquisition of a complete understanding of mental state terms 
like think and know is no small achievement. Not only do they have to recognize 
the possible different senses and uses of these terms but they also have to learn 
how appropriate each one of these senses is in different contexts. Moreover, 
languages differ in how the senses of think and know are marked linguistically; 
consequently, children may be faced with the task of learning specific terms for 
particular senses of think and know.
Results from Study 1 suggest that an explicit knowledge that “know” can 
be used to indicate “certainty” emerges only at age 4. An increasing ability to 
recognize different sources of knowledge at this age may lead to a more precise 
understanding of this sense of know. Moreover, the results from Study 1 indicate 
that 4-year-old children still cannot differentiate think from know as indicating 
two different degrees of certainty. This finding is consistent with previous 
research, which suggests that during the period between 4 and 5 years, children 
gradually become capable of making this differentiation (Bassano, 1985; Moore 
et al., 1989). 
The period between 5 and 6 years of age reveals some interesting 
differences across languages. Results from Study 2 suggest that at age 5, Brazilian 
children perform better than U.S. children in a task during which they have to 
identify the two senses of think (one referring to the process of thinking and 
92
another indicating less certainty). With regard to an understanding of the two 
senses of know, there is no difference in performance between the two language 
groups at this age. Interestingly, at age 6, for the “know” trials of Study 2, U.S. 
children outperform Brazilian children. 
As discussed previously, one possible explanation for this pattern of 
results is that the two senses of know (saber and conhecer) present difficulties for 
BR Portuguese-speaking children as a result of peculiarities in their semantic 
scope. Conversely, the two senses of “think” seem to be more readily identified 
by Brazilian children than the two senses of know. Consequently, there may be 
differences in the developmental trajectory towards an understanding of think and 
know across languages. A possible future direction would be to conduct an 
investigation of Brazilian children’s spontaneous speech (such as an analysis of 
CHILDES data) and identify the time frame during which these two senses of 
know and think emerge in their vocabularies. 
The prediction that having two words for think and two words for know
represents an advantage for Brazilian children in the novel word task of Study 2 
was not supported, as evidenced by the absence of a main effect of language on 
children’s overall performance. However, an effect of language was found on 
children’s performance on the metalinguistic question, with Brazilian children 
having higher scores than U.S. children. Together, these findings seem to provide 
an interesting tale of children’s developing understanding of the two mental state 
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terms, think and know. The initial task children are faced with is trying to identify 
all the possible senses of these two words. Know can be used to indicate certainty 
but it can also be used to indicate “being acquainted with someone” and “knowing 
a fact.” Think, on the other hand, can be used to indicate uncertainty, a mental 
process as in “I’m thinking about chocolate” and finally, to express an opinion. 
Children also learn when and how to use them appropriately. Having more than 
one word for these different senses of think and these different senses of know
does not help children in this initial task and may even make it more difficult; 
however, it helps them, at a later point in the developmental process, to be 
consciously aware of the differences among them. 
Finally, one important question concerning these findings needs to be 
answered: did Study 2 provide a test of the role of language on cognition? It 
certainly did not provide a test of linguistic influences on non-linguistic cognition 
because of the nature of the tasks used in this study. However, these findings may 
lend support to Slobin’s “thinking for speaking” hypothesis (2003) which states 
that effects of language may be found on cognition devoted to linguistic processes 
(or when there is a need for linguistic expression). The initial test question used in 
Study 2 required children to reflect on the meaning of a novel word: “What is 
Jonas really trying to say?” In order to provide an answer to this question, 
children had to be attentive to the linguistic context, the sentence frame, and the 
information provided in the video about Jonas’ referential intent (e.g., Jonas is 
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trying to draw a picture for his grandmother but he has no ideas). Additionally, 
they were asked a metalinguistic question concerning a potential difference in 
meaning between two novel words. The task children are faced with in Study 2 is 
clearly one that demands “thinking for speaking,” that is, one that demands 
cognition that is devoted to linguistic purposes (i.e., interpreting a verbal 
message). Interestingly, a clear effect of language was found on children’s 
performance in the metalinguistic task with Brazilian children having higher 
scores than U.S. children. Having the different senses of think and know marked 
in the language ultimately may increase children’s awareness of the distinctions at 
a metalinguistic level. In other words, the effect of language can be seen on 
children’s ability to reflect on the language forms and to consciously identify the 
conceptual differences between these different senses of think and know.
In general, the findings of Studies 1 and 2 point to some interesting future 
directions. One possible direction would be to modify the task used in Study 1 in 
two important ways:. (a) including a measure that could potentially assess some 
implicit knowledge of think and know or reveal some level of uncertainty about 
children’s verbal responses (e.g., examining the number of times participants 
attempt to look inside the containers) and (b) examining children’s performance at 
age 5 to test whether there continue to be differences in performance between the 
“more evidence” (“know”) and the “less evidence” (“think”) trials. It will also be 
interesting to test whether the developmental pattern revealed in Study 1 is 
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universal or whether we can find differences across languages, in particular, 
languages like Portuguese that have different words for different senses of think
and know. With regard to Study 2, it will be informative to examine whether the 




The two studies discussed here provided an opportunity to investigate the 
development of mental state terms, specifically think and know, across a broad 
age range: from 2 ½ to 6 years. Study 1 examined U.S. children’s developing 
understanding of the distinction between think and know as indicating two 
different degrees of certainty. Study 2 was aimed at exploring possible similarities 
and differences between Brazilian and U.S. children in their understanding of 
different senses of think and know that are explicitly marked in Brazilian 
Portuguese but not in English. Therefore, the two studies described here may have 
contributed important insights to the question of how and when this 
developmental process occurs and whether one may find differences in this 
process across languages.
The goal of these two studies, however, was not to examine the 
development of theory of mind among English- and BR Portuguese-speaking 
children. The goal was to examine children’s developing understanding of “think” 
and “know” and, in Study 2, to test whether differences in how these two 
languages mark the different senses of think and know could have an effect on 
children’s cognition about these mental states.
Although there is consistent evidence that children start using words like 
think and know early in life (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983), the 
results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the development of an understanding of 
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think and know is a gradual and continuous process that extends at least until the 
age of 6. Some important achievements occur during the period between ages 4 
and 5. For example, children acquire the understanding that one must have 
sufficient evidence in order to “know” something. Moreover, they are able to 
identify sources of belief, and make decisions about what can and what cannot be 
considered sufficient evidence, that is, which of these sources leads to certainty 
and, therefore, to knowledge. 
One could argue that having such an understanding may help children in 
the process of acquiring a theory of mind. Theory of mind requires the ability to 
recognize that human beings have mental states, ideas, beliefs and a state of 
knowledge that may vary from person to person. It is interesting to note that the 
time frame during which children first display an an ability to apply know
consistently in situations of high certainty coincides with children’s success at 
false belief tasks (around age 4). Children succeed at false belief tasks if they did 
not have, at least, an initial understanding of the meaning of know, for example?
One next step, perhaps, will be to investigate whether these linguistic differences 
have an effect on theory of mind. Could these cross-linguistic differences between 
Brazilian-Portuguese and English affect the development of false belief 
understanding? Such research would provide another opportunity to test the role 
of language on thought.
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Finally, it is important to note that the work presented here is 
unprecedented. Similar distinctions between the two senses of think and the two 
senses of know are marked linguistically in other languages of the world. For 
example, French has the same distinction between the two senses of know (savoir
and connaitre) and a similar distinction between the two senses of think (penser
and croire)8. The same is also true of Spanish. Although German does not make a 
distinction between the two senses of think, it makes a distinction between the two 
senses of know (kennen and wissen). Study 2 was the first to explore these 
linguistic differences and whether they are associated with differences in mental 
state terms. More cross-linguistic work should be done, however, in an attempt to 
examine even finer-grained distinctions across languages and to isolate possible
cultural confounds. Speakers of Portuguese may have more in common culturally 
with speakers of Spanish than, for example, speakers of German. As can be seen, 
the work presented here opens the door for interesting and important cross-
linguistic research. Although several questions concerning children’s developing 
understanding of the mind remain unanswered, my hope is that these two studies 
have contributed to the field by achieving two goals: (a) providing a glimpse of 
the developmental process by which mental state terms are acquired among 
speakers of a language other than English and (b) by revealing important 
8 These two senses of think can be used interchangeably in some contexts. 
99




SES questionnaire (adapted from “Questionário de Avaliação Sócio-Econômica 
do Departamento de Serviço Social da Universidade de São Paulo (USP)”
1. How many people are there in your family? 
a. 1 to 2. 
b. 3 to 4. 
c. 5 to 7. 
d. More than 7. 
2. What’s the father’s education level? 
a. College (complete/ incomplete) 
b. High School (complete/ incomplete) 
c. Junior High School (complete/ incomplete) 
d. Elementary School (complete/ incomplete) 
e. Illiterate/ semi-literate 
3.   What’s the mother’s education level? 
a. College (complete/ incomplete) 
b. High School (complete/ incomplete) 
c. Junior High School (complete/ incomplete) 
d. Elementary School (complete/ incomplete) 
e. Illiterate/ semi-literate 
4.   What’s the father’s profession? 
5. What’s the mother’s profession? 
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Appendix B
Description of Procedures for each game
Game 1 (Cards)
More evidence trial (seeing)
The experimenter holds two red cards in his/her hands but children cannot see 
what is on the other side of the cards. The child is told that the experimenter likes 
cats and dogs. One of the cards is turned around so the child can see there is a 
picture of a dog on that card. The child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you know that it’s a …. (dog) or do you think that it’s 
a….(dog)?
Less evidence trial (inference based on what experimenter likes)
Children are asked to guess what is behind the second red card (children cannot 
see what is behind this card). If they cannot provide an answer, the experimenter 
says: “Remember, I really like cats and dogs.” 
Test question: Do you know that it’s a….(cat) or do you think that it’s a ….(cat)?
Game 2 (Boxes)
More evidence trial (seeing)
Experimenter opens a blue box and shows that there is a rubber duck inside the 
blue box. The child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you think that it’s a….(duck) or do you know that it’s a 
….(duck)?
Less evidence trial (hearing)
Experimenter shows a red box and tells the child that they cannot look inside the 
red box but he/she will let the child hear what is inside the box. Music comes out 
of a toy phone (it is not a typical telephone ring). The child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you think that it’s a….(music box) or do you know that it’s a 
….(music box)?
Game 3 (Bags)
More evidence trial (seeing)
The child is shown a bag with holes all over it and sees there is a toy car inside 
the bag. The child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you know that it’s a….(car) or do you think that it’s a ….(car)?
Less evidence trial (feeling)
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Child is shown a solid bag. She is told she cannot look inside the bag but she can 
put her hand inside the bag and feel what is inside (a beanie bag dog). Child is 
asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you think that it’s a….(teddy bear) or do you know that it’s a 
….(teddy bear)?
Game 4 (Light bulb)
More evidence trial9 (seeing how a novel object works)
Child is shown a lamp and sees the experimenter attaching a light bulb and 
turning the lamp on. Child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you know that it’s a….(light) or do you think that it’s a 
….(light)?
Less evidence trial (seeing a novel object and touching it)
Child is shown a light bulb that is painted red and has plastic spikes coming out of 
it. She can touch the spikes if she wants to. Child is asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you know that it’s a….(candle) or do you think that it’s a 
….(candle)?
Game 5 (Gifts)
More evidence trial (seeing)
Child is told that it is someone’s birthday today and this person will get two 
presents. The experimenter hands one of the presents to the child and tells her she 
can open the present. The child can see there is a book inside the gift box. Child is 
asked: “What is it?”
Test question: Do you think that it’s a….(book) or do you know that it’s a 
….(book)?
Less evidence trial (hearing/feeling)
Child is told she cannot open the second gift but she is allowed to shake the box. 
Child is asked about what is inside the box.
Test question: Do you think that it’s a….(doll) or do you know that it’s a 
….(doll)?




Experimenter: I want you to meet my friends, Jonas and Paul. (SHOW 
VIDEO of JONAS & PAUL) They are very friendly and nice. But Jonas comes 
from a place far, far away from here. It’s a place called Nemes. And they don’t 
speak English in Nemes. They speak a language called Nemesian. Do you want to 
hear him speak Nemesian? (SHOW JONAS SPEAKING NEMESIAN)
Comprehension questions:
1. So, tell me. Where is Jonas from again?
2. Do they speak English in Nemes? (No, they speak Nemesian)
Good job!
Now, Jonas is learning English and he can speak English very well, but 
sometimes he gets mixed up and uses words in Nemesian. So I want to show you 
some videos with Jonas and ask your help to try to figure out what Jonas is really 
trying to say when he uses these words in Nemesian, okay?
Warm-up Task
(Jonas’ friend, Paul, is jumping up and down.)
Jonas: Hi Paul. You’re “doofing.” That looks like fun. I want to “doof” too.
Paul: Yes. That sounds like fun!
Comprehension question: What is Paul doing? (“jumping”)
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Now, let’s pay attention again to what Jonas is saying.
(Play it again!)
Experimenter: Jonas said he’s doofing. What is he really trying to say?
Note: If the child says “I don’t know,” you should ask him “Is he trying to say 
he’s jumping or is he trying to say he’s walking?
Story 1
Experimenter: Now, let’s look at another conversation between Jonas and Paul.
(Jonas is looking at a piece of paper and he has a crayon on his hand. His friend 
Paul arrives.)
Paul: Hey Jonas, what are you doing? 
Jonas: I want to draw a picture for my grandma. She lives in Nemes. 
Paul: But you haven’t done anything. What are you waiting for?
Jonas: I have no ideas. (Looking as if concentrating and with a pen pointed to his 
forehead). I’m just “pogging” right now. I’ll decide later. 
Comprehension questions: What is Jonas going to do? Who is he doing this for? 
But Paul says “You haven’t done anything. What are you waiting for?” Let’s see 
the video again and let’s pay attention to what Jonas says, okay?
(Play it again!)
Experimenter: Jonas said he’s pogging right now. What is he really trying to say?
Good job!
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Note: If the child says “I don’t know,” you should ask him “Is he trying to say 
he’s thinking right now or is he trying to say he’s sitting right now?
Now, let’s look at another story with them…
Story 2
(Paul brings back a picture of a flower to show Jonas.)
Paul: Hey, Jonas, look!! I drew a picture. Do you want to see it?
Jonas: Sure, Paul. Oh, it’s a flower!!
Paul: Yes, it’s a flower. It’s my favorite kind of flower. What is it? 
Jonas: I “veeb” it’s a rose but I’m not sure. 
Paul: You’re right. It is a rose!!
Comprehension question: What did Paul have in his hands? What is it a picture 
of? (“a flower”)
Yes, and Paul says “Yes, it’s a flower. It’s my favorite kind of flower. What is 
it?” So let’s pay attention to what Jonas syas.
Experimenter: Jonas is saying “I veeb it’s a rose.”  What is he trying to say? 
Note: If the child says “I don’t know,” you should ask him “Is he trying to say he 
sees it’s a rose or is he trying to say he thinks it’s a rose?
Question after “think” stories
Experimenter: What’s the nemesian word he just used? (veeb) Do you remember 
the Nemesian word he used in the first story? (pog) Do these words mean 
different things? What’s the difference?
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Story 3
(Paul’s cousin Mark is visiting him this week. Jonas comes to see Paul and finds 
him playing with Mark. )
Paul: Hi, Jonas.
Jonas: Hi, Paul. I don’t “zop” this boy. Who is he? 
Paul: This is my cousin, Mark. We’re playing together.
Jonas: Hi, Mark. How are you?
Comprehension questions: Who is Paul playing with? Who is that coming in? 
Now let’s pay attention to what Jonas says!
(Play it again!)
Experimenter: Jonas said: “I don’t zop this boy. Who is he?” What is Jonas trying 
to say? 
Note: If the child says “I don’t know,” you should ask him “Is he trying to say he 
doesn’t know this boy or is he trying to say he doesn’t like this boy?
Story 4
Jonas is reading a book. Paul shows up and says:
Paul: Hi, Jonas. What are you doing?
Jonas: I’m reading a book about elephants. 
Jonas: It’s neat. Do you mek that elephants say hello by touching their trunks? 
Paul: That’s interesting!
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Comprehension question: What is Jonas doing? (reading a book) What is the 
book about? (elephants) Now, let’s see the video again and pay attention to what 
Jonas says next.
Experimenter: Jonas asked Paul: do you mek that elephants say “hello” by 
touching their trunks? What is he really trying to say?
Note: If the child says “I don’t know,” you should ask him “Is he trying to say: do 
you pretend elephants say hello by touching their trunks or is he trying to say: do 
you know that elephants say hello by touching their trunks?
Question after “know” stories
What’s the nemesian word he just used? (mek) Do you remember the Nemesian 
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